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Public pension systems are underfunded, straining state budgets. Historically, many states 
have presumed that they can modify pension benefits only as to newly-hired employees, and that 
they must leave benefit accruals untouched for current workers. More recently, though, states 
have begun enacting more fundamental pension reform that modifies future accruals or even 
reduces cost-of-living allowances for retirees. Nearly all such new reforms have been the subject 
of one or more lawsuits alleging that the federal and/or state constitution bars the legislature 
from reducing benefits or accrual patterns. This dissertation examines the legal underpinnings for 
arguments made against pension reform, and suggests that constitutional doctrine ought to allow 
pension systems to be reformed in ways that protect past benefit accruals while reorganizing 
future benefit accruals in a way that is fairer to younger and more mobile workers. That theory is 
consistent with contract law and constitutional principles.  
The dissertation then moves to the real challenge, which is how to apply that theory in 
particular cases, such as contribution increases, cost of living reductions, retirement age 
increases, or the establishment of a different pension system entirely. In such cases, it is not 
always immediately obvious what it means to protect past accruals but allow modifications to 
future accruals. Given that neither state nor federal judges are pension specialists, courts may 
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State pension systems are in financial trouble. According to a 2011 Pew report,
1
 state 
pensions are collectively some $700 billion short of the funding needed to meet their actuarial 
liabilities. That figure depends on assuming that pensions’ current investments will appreciate at 
about 8% per year indefinitely.
2
  Under more realistic and less volatile assumptions, the 
unfunded liabilities rise to as much as $3 trillion using the state debt interest rate or $4.4 trillion 
using the zero-coupon Treasury yield.
3
 
In light of these looming actuarial deficits, numerous states have begun taking steps to 
reform their pension systems.
4
 While some states’ reforms are relatively modest, other states are 
beginning to enact serious and fundamental pension reform. In Rhode Island, the state treasurer 
Gina Raimondo spent all of 2011 warning of a looming $9 billion or so deficit in the pension 
systems there, a deficit so large that the state would soon be unable to pay what is needed for 
schools, roads, libraries, and more.
5
 Despite weighty political opposition from the state’s 
                                                 
1
 Pew Center on the States, The Widening Gap: The Great Recession’s Impact on State 
Pension and Retiree Health Care Costs (2011), available at 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Pew_pensions_retiree_benefits.pdf. 
2
 Id. at 2; see also Josh Barro and Stuart Buck, Underfunded Teacher Pension Plans: It’s 
Worse Than You Think, Manhattan Institute Civic Report No. 61 (April 2010), available at 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_61.htm. 
3
 Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua D. Rauh, “Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They 
and What Are They Worth?,” Journal of Finance 66(4), 2011: 1211-1249.  
4
 See Ronald K. Snell, Pensions and Retirement Plan Enactments in 2011 State 
Legislatures, National Conference of State Legislatures (April 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=22763; Ronald K. Snell, Pensions and Retirement Plan Enactments 
in 2010 State Legislatures, National Conference of State Legislatures (Nov. 17, 2010), available 
at http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=20836.  
5
 See generally Gina Raimondo, Truth in Numbers: The Security and Sustainability of 








powerful labor unions, Rhode Island enacted ground-breaking pension reform in late 2011. 
Many states have found that reform legislation is just the beginning of a difficult road. 
Within the past few years, at least fifteen jurisdictions have faced lawsuits alleging that pension 
reform is unconstitutional, including Colorado, Minnesota, South Dakota, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, Massachusetts, Florida, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. 
The most significant claim raised against pension reform legislation is that it violates the 
federal Contracts Clause or a state constitutional parallel. In both the U.S. and state constitutions, 
a Contracts Clause provides that the government may not pass laws that abrogate contractual 
responsibilities. Thus, the argument runs, a pension that has been promised to a state employee is 
essentially a contract: the state employee offered work in exchange for a compensatory package 
that included both salary and a pension benefit. When legislation diminishes pension benefits, it 
alters the terms of the state’s contractual obligation to provide the bargained-for remuneration, 
and is arguably unconstitutional.  
A second claim raised against pension reform is that it violates the Takings Clauses of 
state and federal constitutions. These clauses prevent the government from “taking” away 
someone’s property without just compensation. The argument is that state pension benefits are a 
promised stream of monetary payments that has present economic value, and therefore arguably 
constitute an employee’s “property.” Thus, if the state diminishes that stream of payments 




The claim that pension rights are contractual is not only plausible but has often succeeded 
                                                 
6
 In most cases, a takings clause argument appears, if at all, only as a tag-along claim to a 
contracts argument: as many courts have noted, a takings violation might arise only if the 
plaintiffs have a contractual right to the stream of payments, which in turn means that a takings 






in prior state court lawsuits. As a result, many policymakers have thought that pension reform 
must be limited to changing the terms applicable to newly-hired employees.  
This dissertation will argue, however, that more modest changes to current workers’ 
benefits ought to be allowed consistent with federal and state contracts clauses. In particular, it 
will contend that it would be more consistent with the underlying considerations of established 
caselaw for state workers to be presumptively entitled to the pension benefits that they have 
actually accrued for past work, but that changes to future accruals are permissible. (Accrual is a 
concept that will be discussed further in Chapter II below.)   
Consider the case of pension benefit increases. Imagine, for example, that for 29 out of 
30 years of a state worker’s working life, a statute provided that the cost of living allowance 
(COLA)  for state employees’ pensions would be 2.5%, but the statutory COLA was raised to 
3% during the last year of that person’s career.  It is hard to see why that person would now be 
contractually entitled to a 3% COLA for the rest of his life, possibly another 30 years. Why is 
that so, given that the worker spent the overwhelming majority of his or her career contributing 
to a system that, at the time, was designed to allow for a lower COLA? Put more broadly, by 
what principle of contract law should retirees be guaranteed the highest level of benefit that 
might ever have momentarily been put in place during their entire working lives?  
This standard does not seem a plausible application of principles of contract law. 
Pensions are merely an alternative way of structuring salary-based compensation, after all: rather 
than paying a worker’s entire salary today, the state government sets aside a portion and invests 
it so as to be able to pay out a pension after 25 or 30 years. If wages are increased – say, from 
$45,000 to $48,000 –state employees with 28 years of service at the lower wage would not 






$48,000. Those employees bargained for and worked for the lower wage for those 28 years. To 
be sure, if they continue working under the wage increase, they will receive the higher salary on 
a going-forward basis, but they are not entitled to have their wages retroactively increased for all 
the previous years of employment: they never provided consideration for such a wage increase. 
By the same reasoning, when pension benefits are increased, it is not plausible to argue 
that anyone within the system, no matter how near retirement, is then constitutionally entitled to 
receive that higher pension benefit during his or her entire retirement. Pensions are just back-
loaded salary. If someone works for 28 years with the expectation of a certain pension benefit, 
and that benefit is raised on a going-forward basis for the last two years of his or her 
employment, he or she is contractually entitled to the higher benefit for the last two years, but 
not for the earlier 28, since the higher benefit is not what he or she bargained for during all of his 
or her previous years of employment. 
Consider then the case of pension benefit decreases. What are employees entitled to? 
Courts in several states have offered the suggestion, albeit without weighing the full implications 
thereof, that state workers have a contractual interest in the pension benefits as they exist on the 
date that a worker begins his or her career. These courts seem driven to such a conclusion out of 
the fear that employees who contributed to a pension system for, say, 5 or 10 years could then 
see those already-accrued benefits reduced or eliminated by the time they reached retirement.  
Again, though, the prorated solution makes perfect sense: Consider the flip side of my 
initial analogy: imagine that the pension system includes a 3% COLA for the first year of an 
employee’s 30-year career, but is reduced to a 2.5% COLA for the remaining 29 years of that 
employee’s career. No court has faced exactly such a situation and thereupon held that such an 






courts have indeed said that their state constitutions protect pension benefits as of the date of 
employment.  
Such a holding would make little sense. To return to the analogy to regular wages, if the 
salary for a job is $30,000 during a worker’s first year of work, but then is lowered to $29,000 in 
year two and thereafter, no constitutional problem arises. True, if the state attempted to demand a 
refund of $1,000 for salary paid during year one, that would be problematic, but it is 
presumptively constitutional to offer a lower salary on a going-forward basis. If the employee 
does not wish to work for the new and lower salary, he or she is free to seek employment 
elsewhere (thus providing a brake on any impulse for the state to lower salaries across the 
board).  
The same logic applies in the pension context. If an employee was promised a 3% COLA 
only during one year of his career, but worked towards a 2.5% COLA for the overwhelming 
majority of his or her career, the employee’s contractual entitlement is to a prorated COLA that 




By the same token, though, the employee should be presumptively entitled to a prorated 
portion of whatever higher benefit had been promised for a given period of time. Thus, recent 
court decisions from Colorado and Minnesota arguably err in suggesting that state governments 
have the blanket power to reduce the COLA awarded to retirees all the way down to a new and 
lower level, regardless of any financial emergency and without taking into account how long 
those employees might have worked towards the previous higher benefit.   
I have thus far merely described the default contractual protection that should apply to 
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state pensions. But under current constitutional doctrine, even valid state contracts can be 
abrogated in an emergency situation. Such a situation arguably exists in some states. In Rhode 
Island, for example, the state faces a $9 billion underfunding problem, or around $9,000 for 
every person in the state. As the state treasurer there has pointed out, the proportion of state taxes 
devoted to pensions is projected to rise to a stunning 20% in 2018, up from three percent in 
2002.
8
 Without serious pension reform, the state of Rhode Island would not have enough money 
for many other state services, such as police, trash pickup, or schools.  
Reducing benefits to retirees obviously upsets the reliance that retirees (most of whom 
are unfamiliar with actuarial calculations) may justifiably have had towards their pension 
benefits. At the same time, the constitution is not a suicide pact, as Justice Holmes famously 
said. State judges will therefore be faced with a difficult choice in times of strapped budgets: 
either affirm the limitation of benefits that retirees relied on in good faith, or order a state to 
shortchange schoolchildren and other recipients of state services in order to pay retirees for 
pensions that neither they nor anyone else ever funded fully.  
So, then, the key principle is this: contractual protection ought to be offered to past 
benefit accruals (at most, and given the lack of a true emergency), but future benefit accruals can 
be changed in the same manner that future salaries can. The real challenge, however, is how to 
apply this key principle to actual cases – that is, to actual cases that have been litigated, and to 
actual reforms as to which the dividing line between past and future accruals is not always as 
clear as in the case of employee contributions. For example, it is not intuitively obvious how 
courts should treat raising the retirement age or changing the way that final average salary is 
calculated. The signal contribution of this dissertation is to examine numerous ways in which a 
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state legislature could change future accruals or even change the pension system entirely, while 
still allowing contractual protection to past accruals.   
The plan for the remainder of this dissertation is as follows: Chapter II presents the 
background on how state pensions work. Chapter III discusses the constitutional arguments that 
have been raised against pension reform and analyzes their merits. It elaborates on the arguments 
made above that existing caselaw is best and most reasonably interpreted as protecting pension 
benefits as contracts under state and federal constitutions, but only to the extent that a particular 
form or level of pension accrual was already applied to previous years of service. It also expands 
on the point that even with such protection in place as the default, courts may still appropriately 
decide to allow retiree benefits to be limited where these benefits were never fully paid for and 
where the deficits pose a dire threat to state budgets. Most significantly, several subsections 
examine in detail how courts should apply the Contracts Clause to several of the more 
analytically challenging types of pension reforms, such as changing the retirement age or moving 
to a contributory or hybrid system. Finally, Chapter IV analyzes pension reform legislation in 
several states and municipalities in more detail, with suggestions as to how to implement the 







II. BACKGROUND ON PENSIONS 
A. The Structure of Pensions 
In defined contribution plans, such as the 401(k)s that are familiar in the private sector, 
the employee contributes money to the account, that money is invested, and whatever exists in 
the account at retirement belongs to the employee – nothing more and nothing less. In a defined 
benefit plan, however, the system promises to pay a particular benefit during retirement, even if 
the present value of benefits is out of proportion to what the employee and employer are going to 
pay into the pension system.  
A defined benefit pension is typically calculated as a percentage of final average salary 
(this can be the final year of work, or the average of some longer period, such as three or more 
years). The percentage is derived by applying a multiplier to the employee’s years of service. 
Thus, for example, if a state employee retires with 30 years of service, with a final average salary 
of $100,000, and with a multiplier in place of 2%, then the yearly pension payment will be 30 
years times 2% times $100,000 – that is, $60,000 per year for the rest of the employee’s life.
9
 
The typical pension plan has various age and/or service requirements in order to retire with a full 
pension; in a given plan, for example, an employee might be able to retire after reaching age 65 
with 10+ years of service, or after reaching 30 years of service regardless of age.
10
 
Most pension plans also include some sort of cost-of-living allowance, or COLA, by 
which the pension payments paid to retirees increase over time. As we shall see below, some 
states have set a statutory COLA at a particular number (say, 2% per year), while others base the 
                                                 
9
 See generally Douglas Fore, Going Private in the Public Sector: The Transition from 
Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution Pension Plans, in OLIVIA S. MITCHELL AND EDWIN C. 
HUSTEAD, EDS., PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (2001), at 267-68.  
10
 See generally Olivia S. Mitchell, David McCarthy, Stanley C. Wisniewski, and Paul 
Zorn, Developments in State and Local Pension Plans, in OLIVIA S. MITCHELL AND EDWIN C. 






COLA on the rate of inflation, while others base it on inflation but with a cap, while still others 
have caps and floors on a cumulative adjustment.
11
 A further distinction is whether the COLA is 
simple (that is, applied to the original base amount each year) or compounding (that is, applied to 
whatever the pension payment actually was in the previous year, with all previous COLAs 
having been applied to that payment as well).   
Defined benefit plans are funded as follows: public employers (such as school districts) 
set aside a certain percentage of their payroll every year, while employees typically set aside a 
certain percentage of their salaries as well.
12
 In many cases, however, the state employer “picks 
up” the employee contribution, in essence making both the employer and “employee” 
contribution at once. This is expressly allowed under the federal tax code, which provides that 
“where the contributions of employing units are designated as employee contributions but where 




This all may seem like a matter of semantics at first glance. If the employer offers a 
salary of $45,000 and “picks up” an employee contribution requirement of $5,000 per year, how 
is that any different from offering a salary of $50,000 and demanding an employee contribution 
of $5,000 per year? The answer is that when the employee makes a contribution to a defined 
benefit pension plan and it is defined as an “employee contribution” by the plan itself, income 
taxes and FICA (Social Security and Medicare) taxes are still owed on the amount contributed. 




 See Karen Steffen, State Employee Pension Plans, in OLIVIA S. MITCHELL AND EDWIN 
C. HUSTEAD, EDS., PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (2001) 41, 43.  The distinction between 
employee and employer contributions is semantic, of course; all of the money at issue comes 
from state taxes, whether or not it is first delivered to the employee under the heading of 
“salary.”   
13






But if the employer “picks up” the employee contribution, the employee owes no income or 
FICA taxes on the contribution.
14
 Further, if the employer pick-up is done for tax purposes and is 
taken out of the stated salary, the employee is entitled to withdraw it upon early retirement or 
withdrawal. Indeed, it is a little known fact that federal law does not recognize pre-tax employee 




The employer and employee contributions (if any) in a given year do not represent the 
full dollar value that is expected to be paid out in pensions one day. Instead, the total 
contributions are typically limited to the “normal cost” of the pension system plus any extra 
employer contributions that go towards unfunded liabilities. The yearly “normal cost” of the 
pension system is simply the amount of money that represents the system’s best estimate of 1) 
what this year’s employees will one day be paid in pensions due to this year’s worth of work; 
and 2) what smaller amount of money needs to be set aside today in order to compound (via 
interest or investments) to pay the higher amount in (1).  
We thus arrive at the concept of “accrual,” which has at least three different definitions.  
By the economic definition, as used in Costrell and Podgursky (2010), a year’s accrual refers to 
the amount by which the present value of pension benefits rises for one employee after one year 
of work, over and above interest on prior pension wealth and the employee’s own contributions, 
and based on the assumption that the employee then retires after that year. Prior to retirement 
eligibility, if an additional year of work at present entitles the employee to another 2% of his 
final average salary during each year of retirement, and if there is nothing deemed an “employee 
                                                 
14
 See the IRS’s explanation at http://www.irs.gov/govt/fslg/article/0,,id=181694,00.html 
and http://www.irs.gov/publications/p560/ch04.html#en_US_publink10008974.  
15






contribution,” then that year’s accrual would simply be the discounted value of that increment of 
2% of final average salary. A further complication is that an extra year of employment in some 
cases affects the length of time that the employee will be expected to draw a pension: if the 
employee is currently eligible to retire, working another year adds to the yearly pension payment 
but subtracts one year from the amount of time that the employee will be receiving a pension 
before death, and that accordingly reduces the “accrual” during that year of work. Conversely, if 
an extra year of service helps the employee move closer to drawing the pension at an earlier age 
(say, under an early retirement option or a 25-and-out provision), the accrual for that year 
includes the extra years of pension payments.   
There is a second and very different concept of accrual used by actuaries to calculate the 
normal cost of an employee’s pension. In the actuarial usage, accrual is not directly tied to the 
extra incremental payment that an employee is actually eligible to receive if he or she retired in 
any given year of employment. Instead, actuarial accrual is smoothed out such that it represents 
the normal cost of what should be contributed to the pension system each year so that, assuming 
the employee works until retirement age, the employee’s pension will be fully funded at that 
time.   
In this dissertation, I rely on yet a third variant of “accrual,” as used by the federal tax 
code and ERISA. In those federal laws, an “accrued benefit” means one’s pension wealth 
expressed in the form of what it would cost to purchase an annuity at retirement age, discounted 
back to present value. This is obviously quite close to the economic concept of accrual used by 
Constrell and Podgursky, with the main difference being the inclusion of employee contributions 
in the total value of what is accrued during a given year.   








 First, a plan can provide that a worker’s accrued benefit each year rises 
by a 3% increment of what his “normal retirement benefit” would be if he started working at the 
earliest possible age and worked until 65 or full retirement. Second, a plan can provide that the 
amount by which retirement benefits accrue in any one year is no more than 1 and 1/3 times the 
rate in which benefits accrue in any other year of the employee’s career. Third, a plan can 
provide that if a worker leaves employment before retirement age, the plan must divide his actual 
years of employment by the total years that would have been necessary to reach the normal 
retirement age; then that fraction is multiplied by the retirement benefit he would have gotten if, 
at the date of separation, he had actually been completing a full career and retiring normally. In 
other words, if a worker leaves after 15 years of employment with 15 years left to reach the 
normal retirement age, his pension benefit would be calculated by pretending that he had actually 
just completed 30 years of employment ending at that particular salary, and then multiplying by 
½ to account for the fact that he had worked only half a career. All of these standards ensure that 
accrual is fairly even throughout each worker’s career. In other words, it is not legal under 
ERISA to structure a pension plan as are many governmental plans, letting workers accrue little 
if anything during their first ten or fifteen years of employment but then have a huge accrual 
bump at some later date.
17
 
Whereas accrual is about the “amount of the benefit to which the employee is entitled,” 
vesting is about “when an employee has a right to a pension.”
18
 Vesting generally refers to 
giving the employee a guaranteed entitlement to part or all of the accrued benefits arising from 
                                                 
16
 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1).  
17
 Robert M. Costrell and Michael Podgursky, “Distribution of Benefits in Teacher 
Retirement Systems and Their Implications for Mobility,” Education Finance and Policy (2010): 
519-557. 
18






employer contributions. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “vested” as “[h]aving become a 
completed, consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not contingent; unconditional; 
absolute.”
19
 Under the federal tax code – which here does not apply to governmental plans
20
 -- 
the following standards apply. First, an employee must always have a “nonforfeitable” right to 
his own contributions.
21
 Second, in the case of a defined benefit plan, one of two vesting 
standards must be satisfied, by either of which the employee has a right to the accrued benefit 
arising from employer contributions: 100% at 5 years of service, or a 20%-40%-60%-80%-100% 
schedule for years three through seven of employment.  
In pension jurisprudence, “vesting” is often treated as essentially synonymous with the 
question whether the pension is “contractual”
22
 – if a pension benefit is “vested,” then it 
presumptively receives constitutional protection, and vice versa.
23
 That said, various state courts 
have used a quite different sense of “vesting,” by which vesting occurs at the time of retirement, 
not before. For example, one state court has found that “although we find vested rights, we do 
not find contractual rights,” on the theory that for “vesting” to become “mature,” the final 
statutory condition of actually retiring must be met first.
24
 
Any employer and employee contributions become part of the current assets of the 
pension system, and are invested in any number of ways (stocks, bonds, real estate, hedge funds, 
etc.), depending on the pension system’s choices. The asset base of the pension system is then 
                                                 
19
 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004). 
20
  26 U.S.C. § 411(e)(1)(A).  
21
  26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1).  
22
 Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803 (Conn. 1985). 
23
 White v. Davis, 68 P.3d 74, 99 (Cal. 2003) (“Once vested, the right to compensation 
cannot be eliminated without constitutionally impairing the contract obligation.”).   
24
 Pierce v. State of New Mexico, 910 P.2d 288, 302 (N.M. 1995); see also Robinson v. 






assumed to grow at some rate of return for the indefinite future. Pension systems have typically 
assumed a rate of return in the vicinity of 8%, although a few systems have begun to lower that 
estimate due to the recent economic downturn.  
Unfunded liabilities arise when the actuarial liabilities of the system exceed both the 
future normal contributions and the current actuarial assets. Until fairly recently, the value of the 
assets used for actuarial purposes has not been the current market value, but the “actuarial value” 
of the assets, which means average value over a rolling period of three to five or more years 
depending on the choices made by state law or a pension board.  By using a rolling average, the 
actuarial value does not fluctuate wildly every time the market swings up or down. That said, a 
new GASB rule will eliminate this type of asset smoothing for purposes of financial reporting.  
On the liabilities side, actuaries calculate what the pension system expects to be paying 
out to retirees over time given whatever benefits have been accrued via past service to date. This 
is a calculation that involves a huge number of assumptions, such as how many employees will 
continue in service, when they will retire, what their salaries will be at retirement, what their life 
expectancies will be, and the like.  
Finally, the unfunded actuarial liability is found by comparing the total actuarial 
liabilities to the expected value that the actuarial assets will have when they are needed to pay 
out pensions plus the future normal contributions to the pension system.
25
 If assets plus future 
contributions will not be enough to pay for pensions as they come due, then the pension system 
has an unfunded actuarial liability that must be paid down over time. As noted above, state 
pensions and retiree healthcare systems have a collective $1.26 trillion in unfunded liabilities as 
of early 2011, according to the Pew 2011 report.  
                                                 
25
 See generally Mitchell et al., supra note 10 at 25; 29 U.S.C. § 1002(29) and (30) 






The unfunded liabilities, however one calculates them, do not need to be paid off in one 
fell swoop, but rather can be paid over a 20- or 30-year amortization period. Even so, this 
collective underfunding is likely to be a significant financial strain on state budgets in the years 
ahead. As Novy-Marx and Rauh have pointed out, “Without policy changes, contributions to 
these systems would have to immediately increase by a factor of 2.5, reaching 14.2% of the total 
own-revenue generated by state and local governments (taxes, fees and charges). This represents 




B. Private Pensions vs. Public Pensions 
 1.  Regulatory Treatment 
Private and public pension systems are subject to very different regulatory structures 
under federal law. Private pension plans are governed by the Internal Revenue Code and by 
ERISA, which often mirror each other. Public pension plans, by contrast, are generally left 
unregulated by ERISA, and are subject only to parts of the Internal Revenue Code.  
The Employment Retirement Income Security Act, or ERISA, was enacted in 1974 out of 
a desire to address many abuses that occurred in private pension plans.
27
 Congress specifically 
found “that despite the enormous growth in such plans many employees with long years of 
employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in 
such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and 
stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; 
that owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees 
                                                 
26
 Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua D. Rauh, The Revenue Demands of Public Employee 
Pension Promises, NBER Working Paper (June 2011), at 1.  
27
 See generally H.R. Rep. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code 






and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits.”
28
 Congress specifically 
exempted “governmental plans” from all of ERISA’s provisions.
 29
  
Title I of ERISA
30
 contains the substantive and procedural requirements that private 
pension plans must follow. Title II of ERISA is codified in the Internal Revenue Code,
31
 and 
contains requirements about how pension plans qualify for favorable income tax treatment. 
Finally, Title III
32
 contains certain administrative and enforcement provisions, while Title IV
33
 
establishes the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which insures pension plans that terminate 
without enough assets to pay the promised pension benefits. 
Title I is the main source of regulatory obligations for private pensions. As for reporting 
and disclosure obligations, pension plans must provide all participants with a summary plan 
description,
34
 file annual and supplemental reports with the Secretary of Labor,
35
 notify 
participants if the minimum funding standard is not met,
36
 provide annual funding reports to 
participants and to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,
37
 provide pension benefit 
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statements to individual participants at least every three years for defined benefit plans (or 
quarterly for employees who are investing their own accounts),
38
 and more.  
As for participation and vesting obligations, private pension plans have to follow specific 
guidelines. For example, pension plans must generally be available to all employees who have 
turned 21 or completed one year of service (or two years, if employees are fully vested at that 
time).
39
 Pension plans must protect employees’ own contributions as “nonforfeitable,”
40
 and in 
the case of defined benefit plans, must allow the employees to be 100% vested in the employer’s 
contribution by 5 years of service (or under an alternative vesting schedule in the statute).
41
 For 
employees in a defined benefit plan, the yearly benefits (as a percentage of what the total pension 
benefit would be at retirement age) have to be accrued at one of three possible rates during the 
employee’s career.
42
 Vested participants in a pension plan must be given certain survivor 
benefits.
43
Finally, as for funding obligations, private employers who offer a defined benefit plan 
must make the “minimum required contribution” to the plan each year.
44
 This minimum 
contribution is based on the plan’s normal cost (the cost of funding each year’s accrued benefits) 
and any amortization costs for shortfalls.
45
 
Turning to the Internal Revenue Code, section 401(a) includes various requirements that 
private plans must meet in order to receive favorable tax treatment. A plan that meets all of the 
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requirements is referred to as a “qualified plan.” The plan must be in writing,
46
 and the assets of 
the plan must be held in trust.
47
 The Code also provides such plans must follow certain 
participation standards
48
 and must not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees.
49
  
The Code imposes maximum vesting periods,
50
 and specifies benefit accrual standards that must 
be followed.
51
 There are also dollar amount limits on the contributions to and benefits that can be 
paid from such plans, as well as the compensation levels that can be taken into account in 
calculating such amounts.
52
  Benefits offered under such plans are protected against retroactive 
reductions, as well as from the reach of creditors.
53
  In addition, the Code provides a complex set 
of rules addressing both the form and timing of plan benefit distributions.
54
 
Governmental plans, however, are specifically exempt from many qualification rules. 
The main qualification requirements for a governmental plan are that it must be established and 
maintained by the employer for the exclusive benefit of the employer’s employees or their 
beneficiaries
55
; provide definitely determinable benefits
56
; satisfy the eligible rollover rules
57
; 
limit compensation in accordance with section 401(a)(17); comply with required minimum 
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; fully vest benefits upon a plan termination
59
; and comply with section 415 
benefit limitations.
60
 Notably, governmental plans do not have to comply with the more stringent 
vesting requirements applicable to private employer plans,
61
 nor with nondiscrimination rules
62
 
or various benefit protections such as the minimum funding standards.
63
 
Why does federal law so broadly exempt state and municipal plans from these many 
requirements in ERISA and the tax code? As the Second Circuit has noted,
64
 ERISA’s 
governmental exemption arose for at least three reasons, which also apply to the Tax Code: First, 
Congress thought that private plans were more likely than public plans to incorporate unduly 
restrictive and unfriendly provisions towards employees, and hence private sector employees 
would need more protection in the form of regulating all of the terms and conditions of pension 
plans.
65
 Second, Congress believed that “the ability of the governmental entities to fulfill their 
obligations to employees through their taxing power” eliminated much of the need to regulate 
how governmental pension plans were funded.
66
 Third, Congress worried that imposing 
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Of course, underlying all of these three reasons was the idea that federal regulation of 
state pension plans would present federalism concerns. Congress wanted to avoid the intrusion of 
imposing too much national oversight of state and municipal pension plans
68
 After all, these 
plans are established and primarily regulated by state legislatures, and Congress does not lightly 
presume that state legislatures’ regulation of such matters needs to be overridden by federal 
regulation.  
 2.  How Private and Public Pension Plans Are Structured 
As of 2008, there are “over 2,500 different public employee retirement systems providing 
benefits to the over 20 million individuals employed in the public sector.”
69
 The majority of 
these systems (1,659 of them) are municipal, while 218 exist at the state level.
70
 Although these 
state pension systems are diverse in some respects, some broad generalities remain true.  
With only a handful of exceptions that have traditionally been optional, state pension 
systems consist of defined benefit plans, not defined contribution plans.
71
 In sharp contrast, 
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private pension plans, which used to be defined benefit for the most part, have overwhelmingly 
been transformed or replaced by cash balance or defined contribution plans. 
What makes states choose defined benefit plans over defined contribution plans? There 
are at least three reasons. First, the advantage of a defined benefit plan as currently structured is 
that it can provide a comfortable living for retirees who spent their entire career working within a 
single state. The prospect of receiving a defined pension benefit can encourage workers to stay 
long-term in a particular job, reducing turnover and any associated costs with training new 
workers. If certain workers benefit from experience such that they become more and more 
valuable over time, and if such workers might otherwise be tempted to earn more income 
elsewhere based on that valuable experience, states might rationally wish to give those workers 
an incentive to remain in state employment for the long-term. This rationale appeals to a 
traditional view of public service as a lifetime calling, one in which public servants accept lower 
wages in exchange for having a meaningful pension in their old age. 
Second, defined benefit plans have been adopted out of the desire to shift risk. Having a 
guaranteed benefit is beneficial to many employees, in that it displaces any risk of bad 
investments or inadequate savings onto the state and ultimately onto the taxpayer. With a defined 
benefit plan, that is, individual workers typically do not have to worry if the plan is underfunded 
due to insufficient contributions or poor investment performance, because the government 
provides a backstop against any losses. By contrast, a defined contribution plan places more risk 
onto the individual workers, whose pension payments could be reduced if their investments turn 
out to be less profitable than expected or if their contributions were not sufficient to last for their 
entire retirement years. 
                                                                                                                                                             






Third, a different political element might be at issue as well: public choice theory and the 
ability of concentrated interest groups to extract money from the public fisc while taxpayers at 
large have a much more diffuse incentive to oppose such spending. Given overly-optimistic 
assumptions about how fast the money set aside today will grow, defined benefit plans allow 
today’s legislators to promise an ever-higher level of benefits while leaving the problem of 
actually paying for the benefits to tomorrow’s legislators. One of many examples can be seen in 
California, which in 1999 passed what became known as the “3% at 50” rule,
72
 which allowed 
police and fire employees to retire by age 50 with a pension equal to their years of service times 
3% of their final salary (the multiplier had previously been 2%). This increased benefit was even 
made retroactive, such that police or fire employees on the eve of retirement could retire with 
this new benefit in place, even though neither they nor anyone else had ever set aside nearly 
enough money to pay for it. This new increased benefit is to blame for driving at least one 
California city into bankruptcy.
73
 At the time, however, CalPERS essentially claimed that the 
rising stock market would make the expansion in benefits cost little or nothing: “CalPERS told 
legislators that state costs would not rise above the previous year’s rate for a decade. Its actuaries 
actually did forecast that costs could soar if investment earnings fell – but the 17-page brochure 
CalPERS gave to legislators only reflected the optimistic scenario . . . .”
74
 
Today’s defined benefit plans do harm some employees, however: those who do not 
spend their entire careers within state government, or who move between states. Consider, for 
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example, what happens to a new teacher who either changes careers or moves to another state 
before the vesting period (sometimes five or seven years) has expired. She may be able to get her 
own contributions back from the pension system, but she loses any right to obtain a pension at 
retirement, and has to start over somewhere else. Even if she works past the vesting period 
before moving or quitting – say, for 15 years – she is still relatively harmed. While she may 
eventually obtain a pension at retirement age based on those 15 years of service, the pension will 
likely be much less than a pro rata portion of a full pension benefit.
75
 If she then participates for 
15 years in the teacher pension system in another state, her total pension will be much less than 
what she would have gotten had she spent the full 30 years in either state. 
As economists Costrell and Podgursky have shown by analyzing the pension systems of 
six states in detail, “teachers who split a thirty-year career between two pension plans often lose 
over half their net pension wealth compared with teachers who complete a career in a single 
system.”
76
 Today’s defined benefit plans are therefore disadvantageous to teachers who are  
more mobile or have worked (or will work) in different careers, and whose participation in the 
pension system is used to subsidize older workers who stay within the same state for their entire 
career. 
This unfairness to mobile workers is not an inherent feature of defined benefit plans, 
however. Rather, it is due to highly uneven accrual and vesting patterns, whereby the early years 
of a worker’s career carry little or no entitlement to any pension but the later years of a career 
provide a huge boost to the pension payment.  
One alternative type of defined benefit plan that smooths out the economic accrual 
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pattern is known as a “cash balance” plan. In cash balance plans, the state pension system 
provides each worker with a notional investment account whose value is based on the employee 
and employer contributions. The state then guarantees the employee a particular rate of return 
(such as 5%, as is the case for Nebraska’s cash balance plan
77
). Thus, cash balance plans leave 
the risk of investment loss on the state rather than the worker, but are much more fiscally 
sustainable than today’s defined benefit plans. That is, because the benefit is ultimately based on 
the actual contributions made by the employee and/or employer, politicians are less likely to 
enact a new benefit that is retroactive and wildly in excess of any contributions that have ever 
been made.  At the same time, cash balance plans are still technically “defined benefit” plans 
under federal law, and are regulated as such. 
III. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST REFORM 
A.  The Contracts Clause 
The major complaint about pension reform is that it violates the U.S. Constitution’s 
Contracts Clause, which states that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.” Federal contracts clause cases revolve around the following inquiry: 
“(1) Does a contractual relationship exist, (2) does the change in the law impair that contractual 
relationship, and if so, (3) is the impairment substantial?’”
78
 State contracts clauses are usually 
interpreted and applied in parallel with that of the U.S. Constitution.
79
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Even if legislation abridges a contractual right, that does not doom the legislation to 
unconstitutionality. Instead, the court must ask whether “the State, in justification, [has] a 
significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad 
and general social or economic problem.”
80
 This requirement guarantees that “the State is 
exercising its police power, rather than providing a benefit to special interests.”
81
 Even while 
courts have a presumption against construing a statute so as to create contractual obligations, 
once a statute has been so construed, courts may then be more wary of the state’s justification for 
changing a contract to which it is a party: “Courts defer to a lesser degree when the State is a 
party to the contract because the State’s self-interest is at stake.”
82
 
State and federal contracts clauses are the most likely avenue of success for any lawsuit 
seeking to block pension reform. But as we shall see, judicial opinions are often couched in 
language that is far overstated compared to the actual situations before the court. Given the 
financial situation affecting state and municipal pension systems today, state courts should take 
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the opportunity to reinterpret past precedent consistent with the theory that workers have a 
constitutional right to the pension benefits that were accrued during their working years – which 
includes a prorated portion of benefits that were increased in mid-career – no more and no less. 
As the Arkansas Supreme Court once said in a retirement benefit case, “The permissible 
changes, amendments and alterations provided for by the Legislature can apply only to 
conditions in the future, and never to the past.”
83
 This should be the baseline protection, but not a 
guarantee that stands even in situations of dire economic emergencies.  
A substantial question is how prorating would be accomplished as to any given pension 
reform – COLA reductions, contribution increases, multiplier reductions, retirement age 
increases, and conversions of defined benefit plans to alternative plans (cash balance, defined 
contribution, or hybrid plans). That is one of the main questions that this dissertation attempts to 
answer.  
1. Is There a Contract At All? 
First questions first: does a contractual relationship exist? That is, are state pension 
benefits really a “contract” in the first place?
84
 
As an initial matter, there is the question of whether state pension laws are really 
“contracts” at all. After all, in the typical case, public employees and state governments have not 
literally sat down at a bargaining table and signed a literal contract. Instead, the state legislature 
                                                 
83
  Jones v. Cheney, 253 Ark. 926, 933, 489 S.W.2d 785, 789-90 (Ark. 1973). 
84
 An additional preliminary question is whether legislation is at issue or not. It has long 
been held by federal courts that the contracts clause is aimed only at state legislation, not at “the 
decisions of its court, or the acts of administrative or executive boards or offices, or the doings of 
corporations or individuals.” New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. La. Sugar Ref. Co., 125 U.S. 18, 
30 (1888). Thus, a court must “first consider whether . . . there is shown on [the] record any act 
of state legislation.” St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. City of St. Paul, 181 U.S. 142, 147 (1901); see also 







has enacted a pension law creating a pension system with certain terms and conditions. The 
argument, therefore, is that when people elect to accept public employment given a particular 
pension law then in existence, that pension law somehow transforms into what is effectively an 
employment “contract” between the government and the individual.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that “absent some clear indication that the 
legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that a law is not intended to 
create private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the 
legislature shall ordain otherwise.”
85
 Moreover, the party asserting the existence of a contract 
bears the burden of overcoming this presumption.
86
 Indeed, “normally state statutory enactments 
do not of their own force create a contract with those whom the statute benefits” because the 
potential “constraint on subsequent legislatures” is so significant.
87
 
Historically, public pensions were viewed as a gratuity that imposed no legal obligation 
on the state whatsoever.
88
 Indeed, as recently as 2000, the Arkansas Supreme Court said that a 




Throughout the middle of the 20
th
 century, however, most states had abandoned the old 
gratuity approach.
90
 Today, most state courts have held that pension laws are effectively 
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contracts on the theory that government has offered compensation, and the individual has 
accepted that compensation in exchange for his or her work. Such an arrangement basically 
mimics an employment contract, even if the terms are printed in a collection of statutes rather 
than in a separate “contractual” document. Indeed, several state constitutions, including in 




Other states’ contractual protection arises from state court rulings or state statutes. For 
example, the Massachusetts “retirement system” has been held to “create[] a contractual 
relationship between its members and the State.”
92
 By statute, most pension provisions 
(including the definition of “wages”) “shall be deemed to establish . . . a contractual relationship 
under which members who are or may be retired . . . are entitled to contractual rights and 
benefits, and no amendments or alterations shall be made that will be deprive any such member 
or any group of such members of their pension rights or benefits provided for thereunder.”
93
 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has explained that the term “contract” is best understood 
“in a special, somewhat relaxed sense,” i.e., “as meaning that the retirement scheme has 




As for the specific states that have recently been sued, courts have taken both sides as to 
whether state pension systems create a contractual benefit or not. Massachusetts has already 
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recognized contractual protection for its state pension system, as noted above. The Colorado 
Supreme Court has found that “rights which accrue under a pension plan are contractual 
obligations which are protected under article II, section 11, of the Colorado Constitution.”
95
 The 
South Dakota Supreme Court has likewise held that pensions are considered a form of contract.
96
 
Only a few states have said that their pension benefits are not contractual, at least not for 
constitutional purposes. The reasoning usually starts from the premise, long acknowledged in 
federal constitutional cases, that a statutory enactment is generally presumed not to create 
“contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature shall 
ordain otherwise. . . . Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revision and repeal, and 
to construe laws as contracts when the obligation is not clearly and unequivocally expressed 
would be to limit drastically the essential powers of a legislative body.”
97
As the First Circuit has 
noted, “Finding a public contractual obligation has considerable effect. It means that a 
subsequent legislature is not free to significantly impair that obligation for merely rational 
reasons. Because of this constraint on subsequent legislatures, and thus on subsequent decisions 
by those who represent the public, there is, for the purposes of the Contract Clause, a higher 
burden to establish that a contractual obligation has been created.”
98
 
Thus, in Maine, the state supreme court has held that while retirement benefits may be a 
form of property that cannot be taken away without due process, they nonetheless fall short of a 
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full contractual right: “[t]o rule otherwise would prohibit the State from amending its retirement 
plan without giving many years of notice and would unduly restrict the power of the 
legislature.”
99
 The Connecticut Supreme Court has said that “[i]f that reasoning were carried to 
its logical conclusion, the state would be powerless to reduce the pay or shorten the tenure of any 
state employee without posing a possible contract clause violation.”
100
 
As an example of how exactingly courts might look for a clear statement of contractual 
liability, consider the First Circuit’s ruling in Parker v. Wakelin.
101
 Maine had revised its 
teachers’ pension system by, among other things, requiring vested members to contribute at a 
higher rate, capping salary increases that would used to calculate teachers’ pensions, and 
delaying the first COLA by 6 months for future retirees.
102
 At the time, Maine law provided that 
“no amendment . . . may cause any reduction in the amount of benefits which would be due a 
member . . . on the date immediately preceding the effective date of the amendment.” In the First 
Circuit’s view, the word “due” could easily have meant payments that were immediately due to a 
retiree, not the mere prospect of future payments. Thus, the Maine statute had not 
“unmistakably” given current workers a contractual right to avoid any increased contributions or 
other changes to their future pensions.
103
 
The above analysis, however, seems to miss the boat in a significant way: the First 
Circuit seemed to assume that allowing “contract rights” at all would prevent Maine from raising 
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the contribution rate for future payments into the system; since the court viewed an increase in 
contribution rates as a reasonable policy that had not been forsworn by the state, it rejected 
“contract rights.” But treating pension plans as providing a contractual guarantee need not mean 
that pension benefits are set in stone forever. Rather, it would merely mean that pension benefits 
already accrued by a given employee cannot be taken away (barring a financial emergency). 
Even if pensions are treated as contracts in that sense, states would retain the right to raise 
contribution rates or otherwise amend the pension benefit scheme on a going-forward basis, just 
as the state can amend the wage schedule or the health insurance package or any other aspect of 
employment as long as it does not take away past benefits. But given the First Circuit’s cramped 
view of what “contract rights” would mean, it ended up using language that would allow the 
state to take away past and already-accrued benefits.   
In any event, the vast majority of states treat pension laws as creating a contractual 
entitlement to something. As seen in the next section, the real question is what that something is.   
2. What Does the Contract Actually Protect? 
Even if pension benefits in a given state are a form of contractual obligation, that is only 
the beginning of the analysis. A much more important question is what the contract actually 
protects. As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, “we begin by identifying the precise contractual 
right that has been impaired and the nature of the statutory impairment.”
104
 
In a number of states, including New York, courts have actually suggested that public 
employees have a contractual right to the pension terms in existence as of the date of 
employment.
105
 For example, in one case, the California Supreme Court held that “[a] public 
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employee’s pension constitutes an element of compensation, and a vested contractual right to 
pension benefits accrues upon acceptance of employment. Such a pension right may not be 
destroyed, once vested, without impairing a contractual obligation of the employing public 
entity.”
106
 In another case, the Arizona Supreme Court held that “[o]ther states, and we believe 
those having the better rationale, have reached the same conclusion that the right to a pension 
becomes vested upon acceptance of employment.”
107
 In yet another case, the Oregon Supreme 
Court held that “[a]n employee’s contract right to pension benefits becomes vested at the time of 
his or her acceptance of employment. . . . On vesting, an employee’s contractual interest in a 
pension plan may not be substantially impaired by subsequent legislation.”
108
 
Other state courts have held that pension rights become contractual at some point later 
than the beginning of employment, although the exact period is usually undefined. For example, 
in one case, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a public employee has a contractual right in the 
state pension system after “continued employment over a reasonable period of time during which 
substantial services are furnished to the employer, plan membership is maintained, and regular 
                                                                                                                                                             
constitutionally protected right in his or her pension vests upon the acceptance and 
commencement of employment, subject to reasonable or equitable unilateral changes by the 
Legislature.”); Ballentine v. Koch, 674 N.E.2d 292, 294 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996) (“Article V, § 7 of 
the NY Constitution protects as ‘a contractual relationship’ the benefits of membership in a 
public pension or retirement system against diminishment and impairment. The provision fix[es] 
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contributions into the fund are made.”
109
 As the Tennessee Supreme Court said, “While we agree 
with the implicit holding of the courts below that a public employer may from time to time offer 
additional benefits which employees may accept expressly or by acquiescence, nevertheless we 
are not convinced that a plan is ‘frozen’ against detrimental changes or modifications the 
moment an employee begins to participate in it, where such changes are necessary to preserve 
the fiscal and actuarial integrity of the plan as a whole. It seems to us that public policy demands 
that there be a right on the part of the public employer to make reasonable modifications in an 
existing plan if necessary to create or safeguard actuarial stability, provided that no then accrued 
or vested rights of members or beneficiaries are thereby impaired.”
110
 
Still other states have suggested that pension rights become contractual at the time of 
retirement or eligibility for retirement. For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has said, “We 
hold that under Oklahoma law the right to the retirement pension benefits provided to firefighters 
and police officers under our state statutory schemes becomes absolute at the time those benefits 
become payable to those eligible.”
111
 Or as the Nevada Supreme Court held, “Until an employee 
has earned his retirement pay, or until the time arrives when he may retire, his retirement pay is 
but an inchoate right; but when the conditions are satisfied, at that time retirement pay becomes a 
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In Sylvestre v. Minnesota,
113
 for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a 
judicial pension system in which retired judges had been promised a pension of half the salary 
currently allotted to judges (even if that salary increased after a given judge had retired), but the 
pension law had been revised to hold judicial pensions to half of the actual salary the judge had 
been receiving at the time of retirement or as of July 1, 1967 (whichever was greater).
114
 Retired 
judges sued, saying that their pension rights had been unlawfully diminished by no longer tying 
the pension to the current salary of working judges. The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with 
the judges, saying “Here, a judge gives up the right to continue in the only field of endeavor in 
which he has been educated and is experienced in order to accept a position, often for a much 
smaller financial reward, anticipating that upon retirement the state will continue to pay him part 
of his salary. Inflation affects retired judges the same as it does anyone else; and a judge’s 
reliance upon the state’s offer to pay, upon his retirement, a part of the salary allotted to his 
office surely is one of the significant considerations that induces the judge to remain in office 
during the required period of time and until the age permitting retirement.”
115
 Then in 
Christensen v. Minneapolis Municipal Employees Ret. Board,
116
 an employee had retired from 
the city of Minneapolis at age 38 after 10 years of service, but his pension was later suspended 
when the retirement age was raised to age 60.
117
 The Minnesota Supreme Court found that 
raising the retirement age retroactively was an “unconstitutional impairment of contractual 
obligations to the extent that it purports to apply to elected city officials, . . . already retired at the 
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time of its enactment.”
118
 Moreover, there is federal caselaw to the effect that pensions are 




In the classic case of Police Pension and Relief Bd. of City and County of Denver v. 
McPhail,
120
 the Colorado Supreme Court seemed to indicate that pension rights are fully 
protected only at the time of eligibility to retire: “Until the employee has earned his retirement 
pay, or until the time arrives when he may retire, his retirement pay is but an inchoate right but 
when his retirement pay becomes a vested right of which the pension entitled thereof cannot be 
deprived, it has ripened into a full contractual obligation.”
121
 But later Colorado cases have 
indicated, as noted above, that pension amendments prior to retirement need to be balanced so 
that they do not pose an overall detriment to workers.  
What are we to make of all this disagreement over the timing of when pension benefits 
receive contractual protection? It may seem counterintuitive – given the disparity between saying 
that contractual protection arises on the first day of employment versus at the time of retirement 
– but there ought not be as much disagreement as meets the eye. One can see a common theme 
emerging from the caselaw, no matter what the putative holding: employees have a right to 
                                                 
118
 Id. at 752. 
119
 Hoefel v. Atlas Tack Corp., 581 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1978) (explaining that “the 
promise of a pension constitutes an offer which, upon performance of the required service by the 
employee[,] becomes a binding obligation”); Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Mgmt., Inc. Employee 
Sav. Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651, 661 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that a “pension plan is a unilateral 
contract which creates a vested right in those employees who accept the offer it contains by 
continuing in employment for the requisite number of years”). 
120
 139 Colo. 330 (1959). 
121
 Id. at 342 (quoting Retirement Board of Allegheny County v. McGovern, 174 A. 400 
(Pa. 1934)); see also Police Pension and Relief Bd. of City and County of Denver v. Bills, 148 
Colo. 383, 38 (1961) (“retirement rights [at eligibility to retire] thereupon become a vested 






pension benefits that they have already accrued, but not necessarily to the accrual of future 
benefits. Courts should more explicitly recognize this principle in current and future lawsuits.  
In most of the previous cases suggesting that pensions are contractually protected from 
the outset of employment, the actual situation before the court was one in which the employees 
had worked for a number of years, or even their entire careers, with a particular level of expected 
pension benefits that were then lowered as to the employee’s entire career. What motivates these 
courts is evidently the fear that states might try to take away pension benefits that were accrued 
in year 1, year 2, and so forth. But in most of these cases, the court did not consider the question 
of whether employees have a right not just to the benefits they accrued in previous years but a 
right to block any changes made on a forward-looking basis only as to future accruals. 
Take, for example, the much-cited California case of Kern v. City of Long Beach.
122
 That 
case found that an employee had “pension rights as soon as he has performed substantial services 
for his employer.”
123
 This would seem to indicate maximal protection, starting very early in an 
employee’s career (if not on the first day of employment). But the actual situation before the 
court was one of gross unfairness, in which Kern had worked for nearly 20 years as a fireman, 
but the city completely repealed its pension plan just 32 days before he finished the 20-year 
eligibility period. As a result, he would have gotten no pension at all despite having contributed 
to the pension system for many years.
124
 Whatever language the court might have used about the 
timing of when pensions are somehow locked in place, the factual situation before the court was 
not remotely akin to a state that reduces forward-looking accrual after a year or two of 
employment while protecting past accruals.  
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Consider as well Police Pension and Relief Board of City and County of Denver v. 
Bills,
125
 a prominent Colorado Supreme Court case in which the court held that after a public 
employee begins working, but before he attains retirement eligibility, the terms of his pension 
benefit can be modified only “if these changes strengthen or better it, or if they are actuarially 
necessary.”
126
 As in other states, the Colorado Supreme Court seemed to hold that it is illicit to 
alter pension benefits even on a going-forward basis, except certain limited circumstances. But 
as with the other cases discussed above, Bills did not concern plaintiffs who had merely begun 
working and whose benefits were altered on a forward-looking basis at some point after Day 
One. To the contrary, the plaintiffs had already retired from the Denver Police Department at a 
time when the city charter provided that pensions would rise at half the rate of increases to the 
salaries of current police officers. After the plaintiffs retired, the city charter was amended to 
repeal this so-called “escalator clause,” and the court said that the amendment could not be 
applied retroactively to workers who were retired or eligible to retire.
127
 
Similarly, in Betts, the plaintiff had worked from 1959 to 1967, and wanted to avoid a 
reduction in benefits passed in 1974.
128
 In the Arizona case, the plaintiff had worked from 1942 
to 1962, and wished to have the benefit of the pension benefit promised before a 1952 
amendment to the plan. In other words, he had worked for ten years under the old benefit.
129
 And 
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in the Oregon case, the court merely held that a 1991 pension reform law subjecting pensions to 
taxation was “a nullity as it relates to PERS retirement benefits accrued or accruing for work 
performed before the effective date of that 1991 legislation.”
130
 
As for cases finding contractual protection at some mid-career point, the usual point of 
such cases is to acknowledge the state’s ability to change pension accrual on a forward-looking 
basis. In a Delaware case, for example, the state supreme court held, “Because in 1964 the period 
for vesting of pensions was 30 years, Petras, who had only completed two years service before 
the free credit provision was changed, had no vested right in that provision or, for that matter, in 
the plan as a whole. The General Assembly’s modification of the pension plan, therefore, did not 
violate any contractual right.”
131
 As the West Virginia Supreme Court said, “[C]hanges can be 
made with regard to employees with so few years of service that they cannot be said to have 
relied to their detriment. Line drawing in this latter regard must be made on a case-by-case basis, 
but after ten years of state service detrimental reliance is presumed.”
132
 
Finally, as for cases finding contractual protection at the time of retirement or 
thereabouts, the purpose once again is to preserve the state’s ability to make forward-looking 
changes to the pension system. As the Louisiana Supreme Court said, “As in the area of 
retirement benefits, where courts have consistently held that a public employee’s right to 
retirement benefits does not ‘vest’ until eligibility for retirement is attained, reemployment 
benefits for retirees likewise do not vest until eligibility as to age and service is attained. Prior to 
the achievement of eligibility, courts have deemed the right to be inchoate and the details of a 
contributory retirement system, such as rate of contribution, benefits, length of service, and age 
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requirements could be modified to the prejudice of the employee.”
133
 
As a federal district court in Oregon pointed out, “The Contract Clause does not prohibit 
legislation that operates prospectively,”
134
 and “[i]f the State of Oregon is to be bound to provide 
employees a set level of benefits in perpetuity, such a legislative intent must be clear.”
135
 That 
court found that Oregon statutes had not given employees a contractual right “not only to what 
was in their accounts, but also to the terms in existence at the time of their employment for future 
service.”
136
 Another federal district court has held that “an immutable, unalterable pension plan 
as to future benefits to be earned pro rata by future employment service” would be “void ab 
initio as a surrender of an essential element of the State’s sovereignty.”
137
 
In short, whatever the court says about the timing of contractual protection, a consistent 
theme arguably emerges: employees ought to have a right to pension benefits that they have 
already accrued, but the state should still have the flexibility to modify the pension system going 
forward. It is just that in the most employee-protective cases, the legislature had not modified the 
pension system going forward, but had tried to take away pension benefits earned years before. 
In such circumstances, it is not surprising that a court might have used language suggesting that 
the employees were entitled to pension benefits when earned (that is, starting in those early years 
of employment). But such holdings do not really address the question of whether employees 
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have a right not just to past accruals but to keep accruing pension benefits at the same or higher 
rate in the future.  
Indeed, what would we make of a seemingly employee-protective rule giving employees 
the right to block forward-looking modifications to how pension benefits were to be accrued in 
future years of service? Such a holding would be curious, given that state governments retain the 
power to control salaries and jobs.
138
 That is, I am unaware of any court holding that state 
governments are constitutionally forbidden from implementing, on a going forward basis, an 
across-the-board salary reduction or diminishment in the workforce.
139
 Thus, it would be odd for 
a court to suggest that state workers are, from day one, contractually entitled to receive a 
particular pension formula, when that formula itself is based on salaries and employment that the 
state can alter.  
To take a hypothetical example, imagine that a state pension system offers a pension that 
is based on a 2% multiplier: if an employee retires with 30 years of service, his pension would 
then be 60% (or 30 years times 2%) of his final average salary. Under the hypothetical right to 
block future modifications, someone who started working today would be entitled to a 2% 
multiplier 30 years from now.  
But suppose that after 15 years of a particular worker’s career, the state pension system 
tries to decrease the benefit to a 1.5% multiplier. We can distinguish at least two ways that the 
state might go about this change. First, suppose the state literally tries to abolish the 2% 
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multiplier forever, such that the employee can no longer count on a 2% multiplier at all when he 
retires 15 years down the road. That change would seem unfair, because the employee had 
already worked for 15 years under a compensation package that was based on a particular current 
salary plus a particular pension (including the 2% multiplier) later – that package was what he 
had bargained for. So it does seem intuitively wrong for the state to attempt to deny him any 
portion of the 2% multiplier at any point.  
However, suppose that the state merely changes the pension multiplier going forward to 
1.5%, while allowing current and former employees to receive a prorated multiplier based on 
their years of service. In the case of the 15-year employee who is planning on retiring after 
another 15 years, he would have worked half his career while planning on a 2% multiplier and 
half his career while planning on a 1.5% multiplier. Thus, at retirement, he is given a multiplier 
that splits the difference: 1.75%. Indeed, Rhode Island did something very similar in its 2011 
reform package (i.e., it changed the multiplier for future years of service to 1%, as part of a 
hybrid plan). Does the worker have any contractual claim to anything more than that?  
By the normative theory presented in this dissertation, he does not. Not only does he have 
no contractual right to anything more than that, if a court holds that he does, then what is to stop 
the state from freezing or reducing his salary, such that his pension in retirement equals whatever 
it would have been with a lower multiplier? For that matter, what is to stop the state from laying 
off the worker at 20 years of service, thus lessening the pension that he is ever eligible to 
receive?  
State employees have no constitutional right to perpetual employment, after all; even if 
they have a property right to their jobs (as is the case with academic tenure, for example), they 






be treated in some cases as having a constitutional right to a particular level of pension, but it is 
an odd constitutional right that can so easily and legitimately be extinguished. 
Recall why we think that pension benefits are contractual in the first place: because 
pension benefits “represent a form of deferred compensation for services rendered.”
140
 As the 
West Virginia Supreme Court pointed out, “By promising pension benefits, the State entices 
employees to remain in the government’s employ, and it is the enticement that is at the heart of 
employees’ constitutionally protected contract right after substantial reliance not to have their 
own pension plan detrimentally altered.”
141
 Or as the Washington Supreme Court put it, 
“[W]here an employer has a pension plan and the employees know of it, continued employment 
constitutes consideration for the promise to pay the pension. . . . A retirement pension is pay 




If pension benefits are akin to deferred salary, then it follows that pension benefits, just 
like wages themselves, are (or ought to be) tied to specific periods of service. If I work for one 
year at a given salary plus a given level of pension benefits that are promised for some future 
date, then the salary plus pension represents the total compensation package that I bargained for 
in that year of service. If I then work for a second year at a higher salary plus the same pension 
benefit, that package represents the total compensation that I bargained for in that second year of 
service. If I then work for the same salary but a higher pension benefit for a third year, that 
compensation package represents what I bargained for in that third year of service.  
All of this may seem needlessly rudimentary, of course. But it leads to an important 
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point: if I work for Salary X in years one through ten, and then for Salary X+$10,000 in years 
eleven through twenty, my rights have not been harmed at all by the fact that the salary was 
lower in years one through ten. During the first ten years, I was willing to work for Salary X. 
The mere fact that the salary was raised in later years cannot possibly cause me to be injured, 
such that I could then sue the employer to demand that the salary in years one through ten be 
retroactively raised to X+$10,000.  
The same logic should apply to pensions. At the extreme case, imagine that I accrue 
pension benefits that include a 2% COLA during 29 years and 364 days of employment, and then 
that COLA is raised to 3% on my last day of employment. Thus, the contractual bargain that I 
struck during all but one day of my employment was for a 2% COLA. If I start receiving the 3% 
COLA during retirement – let’s say for the first five years of retirement – and that COLA is then 
lowered to 2%, have I been injured at all? The opposite seems the case: given that I worked for 
nearly all my career while planning on a 2% COLA, it seems that the 3% COLA was an 
undeserved windfall. 
This reasoning can then be extended. If I accrue a particular level of pension benefits 
during years one through fifteen of employment, and then accrue a higher level of pension 
benefits during years sixteen through thirty, it would seem odd if I am then able to claim a legal 
right to receive only the higher level of pension benefits for the entirety of my retirement years. 
After all, didn’t I spend half my career working for the lower level of retirement benefits? How 
can it be that I have a right to receive only the higher level of retirement benefits, any more than 
I have the right to receive backpay for the years during which I worked at a lower wage?    
The Lyon case from California sets forth this principle.
143
 In that case, a legislator retired 
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and began receiving a pension that, by the law at the time, was tied to the salaries of current 
legislators. For more than ten years, he received no adjustments, as legislative pay remained 
stuck at $500 per month.
144
 In 1963, the California legislature adopted a COLA for retired 
legislators, and then in 1966, the California Constitution was amended to raise legislative salaries 
to $16,000 per year while prohibiting any pensions from being adjusted upwards based on the 
new higher salary.
145
 Lyon’s widow sued to obtain a higher benefit tied to current legislative 
salaries, but the California appellate court disagreed. That court held that the purpose of tying 
pensions to current salaries was to mimic a cost-of-living allowance, but the large increase to 
$16,000 a year had nothing to do with an increase in the cost of living. Given the new statutory 
COLA in place, Lyon’s widow had no reasonable expectation of getting a cost-of-living increase 
based on the fact that legislative salaries more than doubled in a single year, particularly given 
that Lyon himself had contributed to the pension system based on the old lower salary. To let 
Lyon’s widow have such a huge COLA would amount to a “windfall.”
146
 
For federal law purposes, employers can modify pension plans prospectively, or even 
terminate such plans, as long as past accrued benefits are protected.
147
 The theory I have outlined 
was essentially followed by one federal district court in Howell v. Anne Arundel Cnty.
148
 In 
Howell, the plan at issue had changed its calculation of COLAs, with pre-amendment service still 
accruing a COLA under the old formula but new service accruing a COLA under the new 
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 In other words, the COLA amendment applied only “prospectively to benefits not yet 
earned by an employee on its effective date.”
150
 The court held that as no Supreme Court case 
had ever struck down a state law “with only prospective effect under the Contract Clause,” 
neither would the Maryland law be struck down.
151
 “The County’s prospective reduction in the 
rate of increase of future pension benefits which had not yet vested does not constitute an 
‘impairment’ that entitles an employee to obtain judicial relief.”
152
 
3. Literature Review on the Contracts Clause and Pensions 
To date, few legal scholars have written about how the Contracts Clause applies to 
pension reform. Two exceptions are Paul Secunda and Amy Monahan.  
Secunda’s article
153
 considers pension reform specific to Wisconsin, in which Governor 
Walker successfully proposed to cut back on public employees’ collective bargaining rights. His 
article reviews the basics of the Contracts Clause and a few recent pension cases. His main  
substantive point is that Wisconsin may have gone too far in proposing that Wisconsin public 
employers can no longer “pick up” any required employee contributions. Secunda argues that 
this new law would unduly interfere with current arrangements without making much financial 
difference to the state’s budget, and hence is likely unconstitutional.  
In Monahan’s first foray into this area,
154
 she provided a fairly exhaustive overview of 
pension jurisprudence in dozens of states. Marshalling all of this jurisprudence, she contends that 
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pension benefits can be protected to the extent they are “already accrued,” but that on a forward-
looking basis, the state “may change employment conditions such as salary or benefits, and the 
employee may choose whether or not to accept such changes by either continuing to work for the 
state or electing instead to seek employment elsewhere.” What is important, in Monahan’s view, 
is that “courts are precise about the duration of the contract” – i.e., that it extends backward and 
protects work already performed, but does not extend indefinitely as to future accruals.  
In Monahan’s next foray,
155
 she squarely critiques all of the thirteen states (most notably 
California) that have held “not only that state retirement statutes create contracts, but that they do 
so as of the first day of employment,” the result being that “pension benefits for current 
employees cannot be detrimentally changed, even if the changes are purely prospective.” She 
criticizes this legal rule on several grounds. First, it contradicts the standard legal presumption 
that statutes do not create certain contractual rights unless there is unmistakable evidence that the 
legislature intended to bind itself into the future. But there is no evidence that state pension 
statutes are written with a specific and unmistakable guarantee that the rate of accrual can never 
be changed for any employee within the system. Second, protecting even the rate of future 
accrual against changes is contrary to all the federal Contracts Clause jurisprudence holding that 
prospective changes to a contract are constitutional. Third, we should not set in stone merely one 
aspect of employee compensation (pension accrual rates) even while states “can terminate 
employees, lower their salaries, and change their fringe benefits.” Employees may well prefer to 
have a compensation package that is structured differently, and it inhibits labor market efficiency 
to lock pension benefits in place. Moreover, Monahan points out, the benefit of such strong 
constitutional protection for pension accrual is “illusory,” given that the only option left to a state 
                                                 
155
 Amy Monahan, “Statutes as Contracts? The ‘California Rule’ and Its Impact on Public 






employer with budgetary trouble is to lay off employees or freeze salaries. 
This dissertation adds to the legal literature by explaining for the first time the specifics 
of how it is possible to change the rate of future accrual and protect past accruals as to a wide 
variety of pension reforms and in a wide variety of recent legal cases.  
4. Specific Types of Pension Reform    
The question in this section is central to the dissertation: how legislatures can take the 
principle of protecting past accruals while allowing future accruals to change, and apply it to 
particular types of pension reform, so that these reforms are best positioned to be defensible in 
the inevitable court challenges The section will begin with the easiest cases and move to the most 
difficult ones (i.e., changing to a different pension system entirely).  
i. Contribution Increases 
Several states have recently increased the required employee contribution. At the same 
time, several state courts have held that increasing the required employee contribution is an 
unconstitutional violation of the Contracts Clause.
156
 For example, the Kansas Supreme Court 
held that legislation raising the contribution rate from 3% to 7% was unconstitutional, and that 
the state can make reasonable modifications to the pension plan, but only if disadvantages are 
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offset by other advantages.
157
 Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that 
“legislation which would materially increase present members’ contributions without any 
increase of the allowances fairly payable to those members or any other adjustments carrying 
advantages to them, appears to be presumptively invalid.”
158
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
held it unconstitutional to raise the contribution rate from 5.25% to 6.25%, because to do so 
devalued the pension benefits.
159
 
The rationale for such a holding is that increasing the contribution rate “alters the state’s 
contractual obligation . . . by increasing plaintiffs’ cost of retirement benefits for services that, 
absent a lawful separation of employment they will provide in the future. That consequence, if 
approved, would permit the state to retain the benefit of plaintiffs’ labor, but relieve the state of 
the burden of paying plaintiffs what it promised for that labor.”
160
 
But a few other courts have disagreed. In AFSCME Councils 6, 14, 65 & 96 v. 
Sundquist,
161
 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that “because . . . appellants have failed to 
establish a right, based either on conventional contract or promissory estoppels theories, to a 
fixed level of employee pension contributions, we need not address the issue of whether the Act 
operates to unconstitutionally impair such a right,”
162
 and given the long history of varied 
contribution levels, “an expectation that contribution rates would remain fixed is patently 
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Similarly, a Pennsylvania pension system started requiring an employee contribution for 
the first time, and employees sued for a violation of the Contracts Clause. But the plan language 
itself stated that the “Board shall have the power, at any time and from time to time, . . . to 
modify, alter or amend the Plan and/or Master Trust in any manner which it deems desirable 
provided that no amendment . . . may affect the rights, duties or responsibilities of the Trustee 
without its prior written consent.”
164
 The Third Circuit held that this reservation of rights could 
not be ignored, and that under basic principles of contract law, “the rule vesting unilateral 
contract rights at the beginning of performance ‘is designed to protect the offeree in justifiable 
reliance on the offeror’s promise, and the rule yields to a manifestation of intention which makes 
reliance unjustified. A reservation of power to revoke after performance has begun means that as 
yet there is no promise and no offer.’”
165
 
How should we think about the contribution issue? Under the framework I have laid out, 
asking employees to make greater contributions in future years should be presumptively 
constitutional, as much so as asking employees to take a salary freeze. Increased contributions 
are inherently forward-looking, after all. That is, unlike multipliers or some other benefit 
calculation, contribution rates are inherently changed on a pro rata basis. If the multiplier is 
lowered from 3% to 2%, the legislature would need to make it explicit that the 2% multiplier was 
to be applied only to future service and that the final pension payment would be calculated by 
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averaging the 2% multiplier for certain years with a 3% multiplier for previous years. With a 
contribution rate, however, the future years’ contribution rate inherently applies only to future 
years, and if one wants to know the overall contribution rate that a given employee paid during 
his career, averaging together on a pro rata basis is the default way to do it.  
Moreover, a higher contribution rate is the functional equivalent of a salary freeze: if, 
say, Florida teachers are asked to contribute 3% to their pensions
166
 (they had previously 
contributed nothing at all), the result to their take-home pay is the same as if they had foregone a 
3% pay raise. Yet no one thinks that employees generally have a constitutional right to get pay 
raises every year: a new year brings with it new financial conditions, and given that an employee 
has not yet performed any work within that new year, the employee is free to take or leave the 
new conditions in his or her discretion.  
Indeed, courts have held that the Contracts Clause does not protect state employees from 
having their salaries frozen or reduced; such matters are seen as within legislative discretion.
167
 
In one case, San Diego changed its pension system by reducing salaries for deferred retirement 
employees and reducing the employer “pickup” of the employees’ contributions. The Ninth 
Circuit held that, based on numerous California state court holdings, these changes did not 
violate the Contracts Clause or the Takings Clause: “as California courts have noted, ‘[i]t is well 
established that public employees have no vested rights to particular levels of compensation and 
salaries may be modified or reduced by the proper statutory authority.”
168
 Thus, “indirect effects 
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Similarly, in a California Supreme Court case – and remember that California purports to 
protect pension accruals as of the first date of employment – a public employee alleged that 
reducing the retirement age from 70 to 67 prevented him from accumulating as many years of 
service, and thereby lowered his pension in violation of the Contracts Clause. The California 
Supreme Court held that “it is well settled in California that public employment is not held by 
contract but by statute and that, insofar as the duration of such employment is concerned, no 
employee has a vested contractual right to continue in employment beyond the time or contrary 
to the terms and conditions fixed by law. . . .  Nor is any vested contractual right conferred on the 
public employee because he occupies a civil service position since it is equally well settled that 
‘[the] terms and conditions of civil service employment are fixed by statute and not by 
contract.’”
170
 The court added that “[t]he fact that a pension right is vested will not, of course, 
prevent its loss upon the occurrence of a condition subsequent such as lawful termination of 
employment before completion of the period of service designated in the pension plan.”
171
 The 
court clarified that it is the “advantage or disadvantage to the particular employees whose own 
contractual pension rights, already earned, are involved which are the criteria by which 
modifications to pension plans must be measured.”
172
 
These same results should apply in cases involving an increased employee contribution 
rate. (No state of which I am aware has attempted to increase contribution rates retroactively, 
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which would present quite a different question, more akin to demanding a refund of wages from 
past years.)  On a going-forward basis, states should have the legislative prerogative to decide 
that a higher employee contribution will be needed to fully fund the promised pension benefits 
on a going-forward basis. 
 ii.  COLA Reductions 
In most previous cases where a state pension system attempted to change the COLAs 
given to retirees, the retirees were likely to win in court. For example, in United Firefighters of 
Los Angeles City v. City of Los Angeles,
173
 the court held that where firefighters’ rights to 
pension benefits had vested under a pension statute that provided uncapped post-retirement 
COLAs, the later imposition of a 3% cap on the COLAs violated the Contract Clause.
174
 
Similarly, in Booth v. Sims,
175
 the West Virginia Supreme Court struck down a law reducing the 
pension COLAs from 3.75% to 2% for active State Troopers whose benefits had previously 
vested and who were eligible for retirement.
176
 And in Arena v. City of Providence,
177
 the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court struck down a COLA reduction that had been applied to firefighters who 
retired under a city pension plan. 
Despite these previous cases, the logic of pro-rating accruals over the span of a worker’s 
career makes sense as to COLAs. Consider the Colorado pension reform bill that is currently the 
subject of a lawsuit. From 1994 to 2000, the COLA for retirees was based on a formula that 
resulted in COLAs ranging from 1.34% to 2.91% per year. The COLA was raised to a flat 3.5% 
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in 2001, and then most recently was downgraded to 2%. Given that the lawsuit purports to 
represent anyone who retired between 1994 and 2010, there are likely plaintiffs in the class who 
worked for almost their entire careers with no expectation of a COLA at all, and who retired in 
1994 after the first official COLA was adopted.  
It is hard to see why such plaintiffs were not being given a windfall for the past 17 years. 
The same logic applies to people who retired in Colorado between 2001 and 2010. Even though 
they retired after the 3.5% COLA was in place, most of these employees would have begun their 
careers before 2001, at a time when COLAs was as low as 1.34% (depending on the formula) or 
even at a time when COLAs were not offered at all.
178
 So for some or most of these individuals’ 
careers, they were working and contributing to a pension system that offered a lower or no 
COLA. By the logic outlined above, it is difficult to see why individuals should be guaranteed a 
lifetime right to the highest pension benefit that was ever put in place during their working life, 
any more than they have a right to have the highest salary retroactively applied to their entire 
working life.   
Even if pension decreases have to be accompanied by countervailing increases, as many 
courts have held, the question remains as to what exactly counts as a decrease in the first place. It 
is at least arguable, if not obvious, that hardly any relevant decrease has taken place if someone 
works for 19 years with no COLA, works for 10 years with a variable COLA, and then is given a 
3.5% COLA the month before retiring. If that person spent the overwhelming majority of his 
career contracting for a pension that had either no COLA or a variable COLA that was never 
more than 2.91%, why is he entitled to a 3.5% COLA for 20 or 30 years of retirement? If he gets 
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a 3.5% COLA for 10 years of retirement, and then the 3.5% COLA is reduced, what increase 
would be needed to balance out the windfall he has already received? 
To be sure, COLAs in the real world are often not simple percentages set in statute 
(indeed, it makes little sense that such percentages are ever written into law), but consist of 
formulas that are tied to inflation, or that include some sort of cap and/or floor. What then? The 
answer is that such COLAs can still be pro-rated for retirees in a fairly straightforward manner. 
For example, consider a hypothetical worker whose 30-year career saw the following COLAs in 
place: years 1 through 10 had a variable COLA set at the legislature’s discretion; years 11 
through 20 had a COLA set based on any given year’s CPI but with a 3% cap; and years 21 
through 30 had a statutory 3% compounding COLAs.  
Here is the simplest view of what that worker should then receive in each year of 
retirement: First, find the average COLA that was actually implemented in years 1 through 10 at 
the legislature’s discretion (say this average is 2%). Second, apply the statutory formula from 
years 11 through 20 to the particular year of retirement (say that in the retirement year under 
consideration, this amounts to 2.5%). Third, take the 3% statutory level from years 21 through 
30. Finally, average all of these together weighted by years of service. In this case, since each 
COLA was earned during an equal 1/3 of the worker’s career, this would mean averaging 2%, 
2.5%, and 3%, for a final 2.5% COLA in that particular year of retirement. Alternatively, if the 
COLA promised in some or all years was compounding, the geometric average could be used as 
a more accurate way to average growth rates that compound over time. 
Alternatively, we could imagine a more sophisticated way to calculate a prorated COLA. 
Imagine that at retirement, an employee receives a baseline annuity (call it P0) that is multiplied 






retirement is P0 * AF (age, rate, COLA), where “age” is age at retirement, rate is the discount 
rate, and where the COLA is determined according to whatever parameters (rate, simple vs. 
compounding, caps, etc.) are in place. One common measure of accrual is to apportion P0 to 
each year of service – that is, P0 = years of service times a multiplier times final average salary. 
Thus, if 1/3 of one’s career is spent with COLA 1 and 2/3 with COLA 2, a way to determine 
pension wealth at retirement would be this:  
1/3 * P0 * AF (age, rate, COLA1) + 2/3 * P0 * AF (age, rate, COLA2). Then, one could 
determine a blended COLA as follows: AF (age, rate, COLA-blended) = 1/3 * AF (age, rate, 
COLA1) + 2/3 * AF (age, rate, COLA2). 
Alternatively, one could also apply a blended COLA this way: divide the initial annuity 
P0 into two parts, applying COLA 1 to the first part and COLA 2 to the second part. Thus, if P0 
was $60,000, one would have a $20,000 portion and a $40,000 portion, and each would have its 
separate COLA applied year after year (this would work for any COLA terms that might exist).  
There is not a strong case that any one of these alternatives should be legally mandated as 
opposed to the others. Still, it makes sense for legislatures to use one of these in manipulating 
COLAs, and for courts to approve such legislation.   
 iii. Changing the Multiplier 
Changing a multiplier applied to the final average salary is also one of the more 
straightforward applications of the prorating principle. If a 3% multiplier was in place for years 1 
to 15 but a 1% multiplier was in place for years 16 to 30, then the final multiplier would be 2% 
(the average of 3% and 1%).   
This is exactly what was done in Rhode Island’s 2011 pension reform: Section 36-10-10 






to retire before September 30, 2009 (1.7% for years 1 to 10, 1.9% for years 11 to 20, 3% for 
years 21 to 34, and 2% thereafter), and for employees eligible to retire after Oct. 1, 2009 (1.6% 
for years 1 to 10, 1.8% for years 11 to 20, 2% for years 21 to 25, 2.25% for years 26 to 30, 2.5% 
for years 31 to 37, and 2.25% thereafter). Then, the 2011 pension reform law restricted those 
multipliers to any years of service prior to July 1, 2012. For all service after July 1, 2012, the 
multiplier will now be 1% for the defined benefit portion of the now-hybrid plan.  
Clearly, then, the Rhode Island defined benefit pension plan now involves prorating the 
multiplier according to years of service, and it reduces the multiplier only a forward-looking 
basis while preserving the higher prorated multipliers in effect for years of service before July 1, 
2012. This sort of prorating should be presumptively constitutional, just as much as any other 
salary or benefit terms that a government chooses to offer for service in a particular year. On the 
other hand, it would arguably be reducing accrued benefits if a state reduced the multiplier 
outright, including for all previous years of employment.   
iv. Changing What Components of Compensation Are Included 
 Recall that the typical defined benefit pension is calculated by multiplying a percentage 
factor for each year of employment times some final average salary. But states differ on what 
exactly is included in calculating the final average salary itself. For example, a pension could 
include base wages and nothing else, or it could add allowances for clothing, travel, housing, or 
other extras, health insurance subsidies, extra money made from moonlighting part-time or from 
working overtime, extra pay from filling in for a supervisor, or anything else that might 
somehow boost whatever is paid. Given that a boost to the final average salary will then boost 
the actual pension payment for the rest of a retiree’s life – which could be as much as another 30 






Hence, states may wish to reform a pension system by cutting back on any extras that were 
allowed and limiting final average salary to base wages alone.  
 How is prorating to be done here so as to protect accrued benefits while restricting future 
accruals? In fact, prorating may not be as difficult as one might imagine. Say that final average 
salary included three extra components during 15 years of a worker’s career, but that it was 
limited to base wages for the next 15 years. What should that worker get on retirement? The 
answer is to look at how much his final average salary really was boosted above base wages 
during that final year or two or three (in other words, how much overtime did he really work, or 
how much did he really get in clothing allowances, etc.). Then prorate that addition to base 
wages based on how many years of his career were spent with those components being included 
in final average salary. 
 A further complication, however, is what to do about incremental boosts to wages that are 
actually eliminated entirely. Suppose, for example, that after year 15 of a worker’s career, the 
police force not only stops including clothing allowances in final average salary but stops having 
clothing allowances altogether. Then what prorating occurs obviously cannot be based on 
whatever clothing allowance a police officer received during the final years of his career. One 
possible answer would be to consider how much historically was paid in clothing allowances (on 
average) during the first 15 years of his career, including any upwards or downwards trend, and 
then extrapolate to what a given police officer would have earned in clothing allowances during 
his final average salary given the historical trend. Prorating would then be done based on that 
extrapolated figure. This is obviously a far from perfect way of determining pension benefits, but 
it is preferable to a judicial holding that clothing allowances (or any other extra add-on) can 






 v. Changing Years of Final Salary Averaging 
One way to clamp down on artificial attempts to boost the final salary by extending the 
averaging period to three years, five years, or perhaps even further. A pension would then be 
based on whatever the final average salary was for a lengthier time period.  
An initial question, of course, would be whether lengthening the averaging period 
reduces any previously accrued benefit at all. The argument that a plaintiff might make would 
run as follows: Salaries generally increase on a yearly basis. If my salary at age 64 is expected to 
be higher than the yearly average salary I will receive from ages 60-64, then perforce a pension 
based on the age-64 salary would be higher than a pension based on the yearly average salary 
from ages 60-64. That being the case, the yearly accrual that I earned at, say, age 30 was based 
on the then-present value of a higher age-64 salary, but that accrual has now been retroactively 
reduced so that it was really based on the then-present value of a lower final average salary. The 
same is true for all previous years of employment: the present value of any accrual in any 
previous year is going to be retroactively reduced when the final average salary is reduced.   
Strictly on economic terms, this plaintiff’s argument is fairly sound. How then would the 
prorating idea be applied here? 
The answer is that prorating could be done along with any prorating of the multiplier 
itself. Here is an example. Suppose that John Smith works for 15 years with the promise of a 
pension based on 3% times years of service times final year’s salary. Then, for the next 15 years, 
he works with the promise of a pension based on 2% times years of services times the 5-year 
final average salary. Suppose that his final year’s salary is $60,000 but that his final 5-year 
average salary is $58,000. What would his pension be, just based on these terms alone? The 






To put this in the economic terms used in discussing COLAs, we might say that pension 
wealth at retirement is a function of P0 (initial annuity) times actuarial factors (AF), and that P0 
is a function of years of service times a multiplier times final salary (itself a function of 
components, averaging, any caps, etc.). Thus, pension wealth = years of service * multiplier * 
final salary (components) * AF. So if a third of one’s career is spent with one final average 
salary formula and two-thirds with another, we now have: pension wealth = 1/3 * YOS * 
multiplier * FAS1(…)*AF + 2/3 * YOS * multiplier * FAS2(…) * AF, which is the same result 
we reach if we just define P0 itself as YOS * multiplier * [1/3 * FAS1 + 2/3 * FAS2].  
To be sure, changing final average salary calculations is not likely to change the pension 
system’s liabilities substantially. In the previous example, changing the final average salary term 
by itself saved only $600 per year. Nonetheless, final average salary calculations are a 
component of many modern pension reform bills, and it is important for courts and legislatures 
to be aware that prorating is possible so as to protect past accruals while allowing forward-
looking changes.  
 vi. Changing the Retirement Age 
Raising the retirement age means both that employees work and contribute to the pension 
system longer, and that they retire at an age when they are closer to death (which leads to lower 
average payouts).  
But when the retirement age is raised for current employees rather than merely new hires, 
an obvious question of fairness arises. At the extreme, it would seem unfair and a contractual 
violation if someone on the literal eve of retirement were suddenly told that he had to work an 
extra three years to be eligible to retire. Such a last minute change would upset all of the plans 






than three years from now. At the other extreme, a 22-year-old who has worked for one day 
could hardly be said to have a substantial reliance interest in retiring at age 62 rather than 65, and 
if a three-year addition to the retirement age is intolerable, he has many years in which to find 
employment that better suits his wish to retire at 62.  
How, then, could retirement age be raised for current employees in a manner that would 
be most fair? Prorating turns out to be possible here as well. Rhode Island’s 2011 pension reform 
raised the retirement age in a way that was prorated based on previous years of service. As an 
initial matter, the retirement age increase applies only to employees who were not already 
eligible to retire as of July 1, 2012. This provision is to protect the interests of workers who, as 
mentioned above, might already be literally on the eve of retiring. Then, as a general matter, 
employees who have fewer than five years of service on June 30, 2012 have to work until the 
Social Security retirement age to retire. This provision is similar to what I mentioned above – 
i.e., the fairly young employees who do not yet have a substantial interest in retiring at some 
earlier age.  
Next is where the prorating comes in: for all of the in-between employees (i.e., those who 
do have more than five years of service but are not already eligible to retire), the retirement age 
is “adjusted downward in proportion to the amount of service the member has earned as of June 
30, 2012,” subject to a lower bound of age 59. The specifics of the calculation are as follows: 
First, divide the total service by June 30, 2012, by the projected service at the retirement age in 
effect on June 30, 2012. For example, if an employee had worked 10 years but was 15 years 
away from the pre-existing retirement age, the fraction would be 10/25 or 2/5. Then determine 
how much the retirement age as of June 30, 2012, differed from Social Security retirement age. 






Social Security, the difference would be five years.  Then, multiply the two figures together: 2/5 
times five years, for a total of two years. At that point, the retirement age for the employee is 
simply the Social Security retirement age (65) minus those two years.  
For another example, if an employee had worked 24 out of 25 years toward the previous 
retirement age of 60, the new retirement age would now be [65 minus (24/25 * 5)], or 60.2 years; 
the retirement age for this employee would have been raised by a mere 2.4 months.  
In other words, the formula in Rhode Island now prorates any increase in retirement age 
in inverse proportion to how many years the employee had already worked towards the previous 
retirement age.  
How should a court think of this prorated formula? Does it properly protect prior accruals 
while affecting only future accruals? That is a conceptually more difficult question. Just as with 
changing the final salary averaging period, a plaintiff could argue that an increase in the 
retirement age during one’s working life inherently reduces the present value of all past accruals, 
because that present value would have to have been calculated by discounting for a longer 
period. In other words, if I am 35 and now have to work to age 64 rather than age 62, the then-
present value of what I earned at age 25, 26, 27, etc., would all have been determined by 
discounting back from age 64 rather than 62, and with any discount rate above zero, that will 
automatically make the present value of those accruals lower.   
There is not as easy an answer to this. Prorating the retirement age by itself (as in Rhode 
Island) does not solve the problem. This is because even if the retirement age increase is 
prorated, any increase whatsoever could be thought of as having retroactively reduced the 
present value of previous accruals.  






of previous accruals even while raising the retirement age. Say that the retirement age is raised 
from 62 to 65, including any prorating as in Rhode Island. Then, for any given worker, establish 
the amount that was accrued (taking into account all of the applicable terms, such as the 
multiplier) as of the effective date of the legislation. Fast forward that amount with interest to 
age 62, when that worker would previously have been eligible to retire. At that point, pretend 
that the worker was presently eligible for an annuity that equals the age-62 present value of all 
the accruals that the worker had accumulated up to the effective date of the legislation. In other 
words, if John Smith is 40 in 2012, but pension legislation is passed raising the retirement age 
from 62, figure out his accruals as of 2012, and establish what that total would be as of 2034, 
when he would formerly have been able to retire at age 62. 
Then, carry that annuity forward up to the worker’s actual retirement age, using the same 
interest rate that is otherwise used as a discount rate (and in the meanwhile, the worker is still 
working and accruing more benefits at whatever rate is currently in place). In the John Smith 
example, figure out what his total accruals as of 2012 would be worth in 2034, and then start 
imputing interest to that amount for another three years to age 65.  At the new actual retirement 
age, the worker retires with a pension based on the sum of: 1) all the new accruals after the 
legislation’s effective date, plus 2) all the accruals prior to the legislation’s effective date, except 
with interest applied during whatever gap existed between the old retirement age and the new 
retirement age.  
In the same terms used previously, supposing that the retirement age is raised from 62 to 
65 one third of the way through someone’s career: Pension wealth at 65 should then equal [1/3 * 
YOS * multiplier * final average salary at age 62 * AF(62)] * (1 + r)
3
 + [2/3 * YOS * multiplier 






Given such a calculation, there will have been no retroactive impairment of the present 
value of prior accruals. That is, because all prior accruals are now going to effectively receive 
interest equal to the discount rate during any increase in the retirement age, then it automatically 
follows that discounting the retirement benefit at the new retirement age back to all of those prior 
years of employment would result in the exact same present value. Thus, no prior accruals would 
have been touched, but the retirement age would have been increased nonetheless.  
To be sure, I am not suggesting that such a system is necessary: given the financial 
emergency in Rhode Island, that state probably hit upon the fairest way to raise the retirement 
age in a way that was more effective at reducing unfunded liabilities. But what I have outlined 
here would be perhaps the safest way for a legislature to implement the principle of protecting 
prior accruals while changing future accruals.   
 vii. Converting to a Different Pension System Entirely 
Converting a traditional defined benefit plan to a completely different structure might 
seem at first create the most challenging difficulties about how to protect past accruals while 
changing future accrual patterns. Even so, this dissertation argues that there are clear solutions 
that should allow legislatures a way forward.  
Cash Balance Plans 
A cash balance plan is a type of defined benefit plan that promises a particular benefit to 
participants. Still, it resembles a defined contribution plan insofar as the ultimate benefit consists 
of a promised rate of return on the contributions actually made on behalf of a given employee. 
Because the rate of return is inherently fixed to the amount of contributions, pension benefits can 
no longer exceed contributions by more than the fixed amount. On the other hand, workers’ 






retirement security for some defined contribution plans.  
The difficulty in constitutional terms arises because the accrual pattern in a cash balance 
plan differs so dramatically from the accrual pattern in a typical defined benefit plan. As noted 
above, a cash balance plan involves a steady accrual pattern throughout each worker’s career, 
rather than backloading benefit accrual to the later years of one’s employment. This graph from 






Although no state has done so yet, a state could convert a defined benefit plan to a cash 
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 Because no state has done so for its current employees, no court has yet 
considered any of the legal challenges that would probably arise. Consider the graph from 
Costrell and Podgursky. If the goal was to allow workers early on in their careers to be able to 
leave with more money in their “account,” but to do so without the state having to spend extra 
money on the pension system, it would be unavoidably necessary to reduce the future accruals 
earned by older employees for roughly a 10 year period towards the end of their careers.  
To be sure, a state could always keep the older employees happy by keeping their higher 
accruals while raising the accruals of younger employees – thus creating a smooth accrual curve 
with a higher intercept than is depicted in the graph above. But that sort of transition to a cash 
balance system would result in considerably higher expenditures potentially for decades (until all 
of the older employees died). Assuming that states do not have the resources to raise benefits 
substantially for younger workers while leaving older workers to collect outsized benefits, states 
would have to transition to a cash balance plan by raising the accrual of younger workers and 
lowering the accrual of older workers.  
Thus, if a transition to a cash balance system involved reductions in the pension paid to 
older workers who retired during the “bump” that Costrell and Podgursky identify, one would 
expect older workers to file a lawsuit claiming that the old system entitled them to a particular 
level of benefits, and that the switch to a cash balance plan had deprived them of contractually 
guaranteed rights. Given that this sort of legal challenge would be new, it is difficult to predict 
what any court would do. Nonetheless, there are good arguments that a fiscally neutral transition 
to a cash balance plan should be a viable option under federal and state constitutions.  
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Before getting to the constitutional question, though, it is necessary to take a short detour 
through the caselaw regarding the legality of private companies’ decisions to switch from 
defined benefit plans to cash balance plans. Such private decisions obviously do not implicate 
the Contracts Clause, which applies only to legislatively-imposed contractual changes. Instead, 
the legal challenges involved claims of age discrimination. These cases are still relevant here, 
because the underlying premise of either an age discrimination claim or a Contracts Clause claim 
is that the pension plan has been changed in a way that disfavors the older employees who were 
expecting a larger pension payment.   
The most well-known such case is Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan.
181
 In that case, 
IBM had switched from a traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan, but was sued for 
age discrimination. The basis for this argument was that the 5% interest credit was applied to 
younger workers’ accounts for a longer period of time, thus making their yearly accruals greater 
in value. The district court had noted that under ERISA, an “accrued benefit” is defined as an 
amount “expressed in the form of an annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age.”
182
 
But someone who “leaves IBM at age 50, after 20 years of service, will have a larger annual 
benefit at 65 than someone whose 20 years of service conclude with retirement at age 65.” This 
pattern of accruals therefore favored younger employees, according to the district court.  
The Seventh Circuit disagreed, however, noting that the time value of money is not the 
same thing as age discrimination. As long as the contributions to workers’ accounts are equal 
without regard to age, and as long as the interest awarded to accounts each year is the same, it is 
not employer discrimination against older people merely because they are not leaving their 
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money in the accounts for as long a period of time. Even worse, the district court’s analysis had 
left out a crucial component: while the court had used the power of compound interest to treat 
younger workers’ accruals as worth “more” at retirement age, it left out the power of the 
discount rate to discount that value at retirement age back to the present value.  
Notably, the Seventh Circuit included a passage addressing whether the shift in pension 
systems had worked to “diminish vested interests.” The Seventh Circuit concluded that it did not, 
because IBM gave its employees the following: “the greater of the present value of their pension 
entitlements as of the transition date or the account balance that they would have had if IBM had 
a cash-balance plan in effect since the employee came to work.” Just as notably, the Seventh 
Circuit said that this shift did not “diminish vested interests” even though it “disappointed 
expectations.” In other words, giving older employees the present value of their pension 
entitlements earned to date might have still frustrated those older employees (if they were 
expecting a still-higher payout after another year of work), but such a change was not enough to 
harm the vested interests already earned. That, in the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, was the key 
point: protecting the past accrued benefits, while allowing IBM to shift to a new system of 
accrual for future benefits. 
In light of what the Seventh Circuit said here, one obvious way to convert a traditional 
defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan would be to freeze workers’ accrued benefits at 
current levels, while changing how benefits are accrued going forward. Under such a reform, 
workers in their early 50s might currently be in the period when the former plan entitled them to 
unduly large pension wealth, and hence they would receive unduly large opening cash balances; 
conversely, younger or newer workers at the lower point of the pension wealth curve would 






workers would see their cash balance accounts increase more sharply in value over time with a 
more even accrual pattern.  
Setting opening cash balances based on the present value of the accrued pension wealth is 
lawful under ERISA when a private company converts from a traditional defined benefit plan to 
a cash balance plan. As noted above, ERISA protects past accruals while allowing changes to or 
even the elimination of future accruals altogether. In at least one federal appellate case, the 
question arose whether a company had sufficiently protected past accruals when it eliminated a 
traditional defined benefit plan and offered its employees a starting “cash balance” representing 
the current value of their prior accruals. What the company did – and this was upheld by the 
Eighth Circuit – was this: ignoring any possible future accruals, determine what it would cost to 
purchase an annuity at the workers’ normal retirement date that would pay them a monthly 
pension based on what they had accrued as of the switch in pension plans, and then discount that 
annuitized value back to the present value using the same discount/interest rate that the cash 
balance plan itself was going to use (in the Eighth Circuit case, this was a generous 8%). The 
plaintiffs had argued that a lower discount rate (one that the IRS periodically sets to determine 
how to calculate lump sum distributions) should have been used, but the Eighth Circuit held that 
setting an initial cash balance is not the same as a lump sum distribution and there is no statutory 
obligation to use a lower discount rate here.
183
  
Similarly, the Department of Labor has this explanation and example of what must occur 
when a private company switches pension plans:  
In addition, while employers may amend their plans to cease future benefits or 
reduce the rate at which future benefits are earned, they generally are prohibited 
from reducing the benefits that participants have already earned. . . . For example, 
assume that a plan’s benefit formula provides a monthly pension at age 65 equal 
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to 1.5 percent for each year of service multiplied by the monthly average of a 
participant’s highest three years of compensation, and that the plan is amended to 
change the benefit formula. If a participant has completed 10 years of service at 
the time of the amendment, the participant will have the right to receive a monthly 
pension at age 65 equal to 15 percent of the monthly average of the participant’s 




Obviously, the Department of Labor here is merely explaining how ERISA rules apply to 
private pension plans; its analysis does not apply to constitutional regulation of governmental 
plans. Still, ERISA is useful for analogical purposes. After all, ERISA regulates private pension 
plans extensively based on the presumption that workers need special statutory protection of 
their accrued pension benefits. If even ERISA, as an employee-protective contractual framework, 
allows forward-looking changes while guiding how past accruals are to be protected, then by 
analogy one could argue that it would be odd to interpret the federal or state constitutions so as to 
provide far greater contractual protection.    
Older workers might still complain that they had struck a contractual deal whereby they 
paid too much into the system earlier in their careers in exchange for the right to withdraw 
outsized amounts if they stuck around long enough to retire at the right time. Thus, their 
argument might continue, to change the pattern of accruals mid-stream – even on a forward-
looking basis – would upset the expectations that the state pension system originally set in place 
precisely to encourage longevity in its workforce.  
Legislature and courts, however, should reject this argument. Even if older workers’ 
pension accrual is reduced looking forward, that is only because they are currently in a position 
to get a windfall at the expense of more mobile workers. To the extent that the uneven curve in 
Figure 1 differs from a smooth line, it is because more mobile workers are paying too much into 
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the system compared to the benefits that they themselves receive if they moved or changed jobs, 
because that money is being transferred to older workers. In a certain respect, traditional defined 
benefit plans resemble a Ponzi scheme, in that the fiscal viability of the oversized accruals given 
to some older workers depends on consistently finding more and more new recruits who can be 
convinced to pay too much money into the system. It is therefore unclear that the basic fairness 
issue normally raised as to pension changes would weigh in older workers’ favor.  
A second consideration is that it arguably makes more sense to view each worker’s 
interest as a comprehensive lifetime whole, rather than as a slice of time late in one’s career. One 
might say to an older worker, “Yes, you have been told that at age 55, you can retire with more 
benefits than were ever paid in on your behalf. But that is only because your own pension wealth 
five years ago was too low, and will be too low again if you work for until age 60. With a cash 
balance plan, you can keep working to a normal retirement age, and have even more pension 
wealth than you have today, in addition to the ability to leave that wealth to your descendants.” 
In other words, over a particular worker’s lifetime, the worker will be advantaged overall from 
not having nearly as many time periods when his pension wealth is unfairly low, even if his 
excess pension wealth no longer spikes to an all-time high during one relatively short time 
period.  
On a lifetime view, then, a cash balance plan is not any worse for workers than the 
traditional defined benefit plan, and there is no reason to think that workers on average would be 
better off with an outsized benefit during a particular 5- or 10-year window rather than a fair 
benefit at all times during their working lives. As Judge Easterbrook said in the Cooper case, 
“removing a feature that gave extra benefits to the old differs from discriminating against them,” 






discriminate against the old.”  
Hybrid plans 
Rhode Island is the most prominent recent example of a state that moved its current 
employees from a strict defined benefit plan to a hybrid defined benefit/defined contribution 
plan. What does this mean? The defined benefit plan already in existence still remains, but has 
been scaled back by, as discussed above, lowering the multiplier for future service to 1% from 
2% or more, raising the retirement age, and more. Then, in a separate move, the Rhode Island 
legislation creates a new defined contribution plan that starts as of July 1, 2012. The terms of the 
defined contribution are mostly drawn straight from 26 U.S.C. § 401(a), which sets out terms 
that any pension plan must be to be tax-exempt under the United States Tax Code. The 
employee/employer contribution rates are set by statute at a total of 6% (divided into 5% and 1% 
respectively) for employees who are also in Social Security, and a total of 10% (5% from 
employers) for employees who are not in Social Security. In other words, the predominant source 
of retirement benefits is being shifted towards the new defined contribution plan and away from 
the traditional defined benefit plan. The main sense in which this is a “hybrid” plan, then, is just 
that two basically separate plans now exist side-by-side. 
Obviously, the rate and everything else about future accruals has been changed. How 
should such a new hybrid plan protect prior accruals? As noted above, all one needs to do is take 
the annuitized value of the defined benefit pension wealth at the time of the pension shift, for 
each employee. Then let that annuitized value continue to earn imputed “interest” each year until 
a given employee actually retires. Thus, any pension wealth accumulated in the old defined 
benefit plan will continue to retain all of the present value that it had, with no previous accruals 






the terms of the new plan (whether that is a hybrid plan or a completely different plan 
altogether).   
5. What about Emergency Exceptions? 
As noted above, even state legislation that substantially impairs contractual rights can be 
permissible if, in the end, the state justifies its action by a showing of financial necessity or need. 
Court holdings on the necessity exception tend to veer in different directions. On one hand, some 
cases suggest that states cannot rely on the mere desire to lower their own financial expenditures 
as a justification for breaking contractual obligations. The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that 
“[a] governmental entity can always find a use for extra money, especially when taxes do not 
have to be raised. If a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend 
the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the Contracts Clause would 
provide no protection at all.”
185
 Thus, in AFSCME v. City of Benton, Arkansas,
186
 a city had 
sought to stop paying retiree health insurance premiums on grounds of economic need, but the 
Eighth Circuit was skeptical: “Although economic concerns can give rise to the City’s legitimate 
use of the police power, such concerns must be related to ‘unprecedented emergencies,’ such as 
mass foreclosures caused by the Great Depression. . . . Further, to survive a challenge under the 
Contract Clause, any law addressing such concerns must deal with a broad, generalized 
economic or social problem.”
187
 
By contrast, in Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
188
 the 
Fourth Circuit held that Baltimore’s salary reduction plan, adopted because of budget problems, 
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did not violate the Contracts Clause. In explaining why it was reversing the district court’s 
opinion striking down the legislation, the court explained that a real emergency existed and that 
Baltimore had already tried other means of addressing the financial shortfall.
189
 
As for the states that recently enacted pension reform, consider Colorado. In Peterson v. 
Fire and Police Pension Association,
190
 the Colorado Supreme Court found that while police 
officers had a limited vesting of survivor pension benefits in a city plan, those pension benefits 
could be altered (as was the case by the city plan’s replacement with a statewide plan). The court 
held that “[h]ad the General Assembly not changed the funding scheme for death and disability 
pensions, the City and County of Denver eventually would have exhausted its pension funds. We 
conclude that ensuring that the individual petitioners receive survivor benefits as long as they 
remain eligible offsets the harm the petitioners are suffering due to their lower monthly benefit 
payments. . . . In order to avoid bankrupting the Denver system and others throughout the state, it 
was necessary to reduce the benefits for the group as a whole. Ensuring that the statewide 
pension system is actuarially sound justifies any corresponding detriments to the group.”
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Suppose that a state’s financial emergency does seem to require lowering pension 
payments that have been accrued in previous years. How can such restrictions be enacted most 
fairly, given that retirees have relied on the pension promises made to them? Imagine dividing a 
pension payment into the following categories: 1) the amount that is due to new increases 
enacted during the worker’s career, but that was not paid for at all by increased contributions(this 
category would obviously include those pension increases that are made retroactive to previous 
years of employment); 2) the amount that is due to new increases during a worker’s career, and 
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that was paid for in part via contributions, albeit at a contribution rate lower than would be 
necessary to pay for a full lifetime pension; 3) the amount that was promised to the employee for 
his or her entire career but that is in excess of what contributions could have paid for given 
accurate actuarial assumptions; 4) the amount that was promised to the employee for his or her 
entire career and that was fully paid for via contributions.  
Category 4 is the easiest: these amounts of money were fully paid for via contributions at 
the time, and therefore cannot be part of any unfunded liability. They should therefore be fully 
protected by the Contracts Clause, even in the case of financial emergency. The other categories 
should receive less protection, culminating in category 1 (which should receive the least 
protection of all). Category 3 was not fully paid for at the time, but was promised to the 
employee for his or her entire career, and the employees therefore have a strong reliance interest 
in obtaining a pension of that amount. Category 2 was neither fully paid for, nor was it promised 
for an employee’s entire career; there is therefore less of a claim on the employee’s part to have 
relied on the promise or to have paid for the benefit in question. And finally, Category 1 was 
never paid for at all, and includes increases that were made retroactive. Hence, no one could 
have relied on that pension promise during those retroactive years; after all, if I go to work for a 
state agency in 1985 and am promised a pension of $X, and if the pension is increased 
retroactively in 2005, I could not possibly have spent the years between 1985 and 2004 
justifiably relying on the hope that a retroactive pension increase would someday be enacted.   
Thus, if benefits must be cut to current retirees, the state should calculate (this can easily 
be done with spreadsheets) what amounts of money fall into what categories for each employee. 
Then any cuts should affect category 1 for all retirees first – that is, the state should first cut (if at 






represent anything that the employee bargained for or gave consideration for in the first place. If 
cuts to category 1 are not enough, the state should proceed to category 2, making cuts 
proportionate to the amount of a worker’s career that was spent making contributions towards the 
increased benefit. And so forth.  
This may not be a perfect system, but it allows the state to urge that it is attempting to be 
fair by cutting first (and hopefully only) those benefits that were closest to a gratuity.  
B. The Takings Clause 
In some of the lawsuits currently before state courts, plaintiffs have raised the argument 
that pension reform is a violation of state or federal Takings Clauses: if state employees do not 
receive the pension benefits to which they are entitled, their property right to the money at issue 
has been violated.  
The U.S. Constitution provides that private property shall not be “taken for public use, 
without just compensation.” Just as with the Contracts Clause, state courts overwhelmingly tend 
to construe their own state constitutions’ Takings Clause in parallel with the U.S. Constitution.
192
 
The question is whether and how this might apply to state legislation that “takes” away 
pension rights. As the plaintiffs in Minnesota argued, “The Takings Clause is addressed to ‘every 
sort of interest the citizen may possess.’ . . . Here, Plaintiffs had a legitimate expectation that 
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Thus, in a North Carolina cases, the state supreme court relied on the Takings Clause to 
strike down pension legislation that newly subjected pension benefits to taxation: “Plaintiffs 
contracted, as consideration for their employment, that their retirement benefits once vested 
would be exempt from state taxation. The Act now undertakes to place a cap on the amount 
available for the exemption, thereby subjecting substantial portions of the retirement benefits to 
taxation. This is in derogation of plaintiffs’ rights established through the retirement benefits 
contracts and thus constitutes a taking of their private property.”
194
 
The question of whether a plaintiff has a property right to a pension is basically the same 
under the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause.
195
 As the First Circuit said, “It is clear that 
this case does not involve tangible personal property or real property. It does not involve an 
effort to reclaim benefits already paid. The only property interest alleged is an expectancy 
interest claimed to derive from a contract between the state and the plaintiffs to afford a certain 
level of pension benefits. The facts here require us to consider whether plaintiffs had the 
requisite property right to support a Takings Clause claim by analyzing their claim under the 
Contract Clause.”
196
 By the same token, pension benefits that are not contractually protected “are 
not property as to which the government, before repealing, must provide just compensation.”
197
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Thus, because a Takings Clause claim is parasitic on a Contracts Clause claim,
198
 it would not 
result in any additional relief under current doctrine. 
Nor should the Takings Clause require a different result than the Contracts Clause theory 
I have laid out. When a state modifies the way that pension benefits are accrued in future years, 
or the contribution rate that employees pay in future years, it is difficult to see how any genuine 
property interest of the employees has been affected. To think that the Takings Clause is 
independently implicated in such a circumstance, one would have to show that employees have a 
property interest not just in money that they have already been paid or promised for past work, 
but also in a particular benefit rate that they had hoped to accrue in the future for work not yet 
performed.  
One additional issue arises in the Takings Clause context: some state governments have 
attempted to defend pension legislation by arguing that the Takings Clause simply does not apply 
to takings of money. They cite, for example, a Federal Circuit holding that “while a taking may 
occur when a specific fund of money is involved, the mere imposition of an obligation to pay 
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What such cases are really about, however, is whether taxes and fees can violate the 
Takings Clause.
200
 The reason for holding the Takings Clause inapplicable is that to hold 
otherwise would eviscerate the government’s ability to tax. But such cases do not answer the 
question whether the government has improperly taken someone’s property not when it imposes 
a tax or fee, but when it directly reduces a benefit that has been promised to someone. Return to 
the idea that pension benefits are really a form of backloaded wages. No one doubts that the 
Takings Clause does not prevent the government from imposing an income tax. But it would be a 
different matter altogether if the government passed legislation that specifically targeted a group 
of workers to have their salaries retroactively reduced. The Takings Clause might then apply, 
even if it does not yet protect those workers’ salaries or pension benefits that might be earned in 
future years. 
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IV. STATE AND LOCAL PENSION REFORM AND ENSUING LAWSUITS 
In this chapter, the dissertation analyzes the most prominent recent lawsuits alleging that 
pension reform measures in certain states and municipalities are unconstitutional. The time 
period between 2009 and 2012 is the first time in U.S. history when generous defined benefit 
plans have run up against a national (indeed, worldwide) financial crisis that effectively zeroed 
out a decade of stock market growth. Hence, it is the first time in U.S. history when numerous 
states and municipalities have begun a sustained effort to cut back on pension benefits, even as to 
retirees in some cases, and to establish new forms of pension systems entirely (e.g., hybrid 
systems).  
As a result, courts are in need of guidance in determining how to apply traditional 
Contracts Clause analysis to these new pension reforms. Courts should not veer between the 
historical extremes of holding either that pension benefits are entirely within legislative 
discretion or that pension benefits are frozen in place as of the first day of employment (as seen 
below, more than one recent court decision can be found at either extreme). Rather, this 
dissertation shows how a more subtle analysis can more effectively resolve many of the real-
world cases that have arisen thus far.  
A. Colorado 
The Colorado Public Employees’ Retirement Association, or PERA, “manages retirement 
benefits for approximately 92,000 PERA retirees and 373,600 PERA members who work for 
more than 400 employers (as of June, 2010).”
201
 It is “the 21st largest public pension plan in the 
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Before March 1, 1994, Colorado law applicable to PERA provided that “cost of living 
increases in retirement benefits and survivor benefits shall be made only upon approval by the 
general assembly.”
203
 The Colorado legislature adopted a statutory cost-of-living allowance 
(COLA) formula for PERA as of March 1, 1994, that led to the following COLAs
204
:   
Year  Increase 
1994  2.82% 
1995  2.53% 
1996  2.84% 
1997  2.91% 
1998  2.22% 
1999  1.34% 
2000  2.23% 
Effective March 1, 2001, a new law went into effect guaranteeing a 3.5% COLA.
205
 
In early 2010, spurred to action by projections showing that the state pension system 
would run completely out of money in 26 to 29 years,
206
 the Colorado legislature passed and the 
governor signed Senate Bill 10-001.
207
 Senate Bill 10, as it is called, made many revisions to the 
state pension system, including the following:  
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First, it lengthened the amount of time worked and the age at which non-vested members 
and new hires would be eligible to retire with full benefits.
208
 Second, it increased the amount of 
money to be contributed by state and school employers.
209
 Finally and most significantly, it 
reduced the COLA given to people who are already retired and drawing a pension. As the chief 
executive of PERA told the Wall Street Journal, “‘No matter how draconian you got on the new 
hires, you ran out of money’ if you didn’t cut benefits to current retirees.”
210
 
As noted above, before Senate Bill 10, Colorado pension law gave retirees an automatic 
increase of 3.5% per year in their pensions.
211
 But Senate Bill 10 “cut future annual benefit 
increases for current retirees to 2 percent, unless PERA experiences a negative investment year, 
at which point the COLA for the next three years will be the lesser of the average of monthly 
annual inflation rates from the prior calendar year or 2 percent.”
212
 In addition, Senate Bill 10 
establishes a 0.25% increase to the 2.0% cap if the pension system is 103% funded or better, with 
a 0.25% decrease if pension system is less than 99% funded.
213
 
The lawsuit Justus v. Colorado
214
 was filed on March 17, 2010, in Denver County. 
According to the complaint, the main plaintiff “Gary R. Justus is a Colorado resident who 
worked for more than 29 years for the Denver Public Schools (“DPS”) before retiring in 2003. 
Until December 31, 2009, he received his pension through the Denver Public Schools Retirement 
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System (“DPSRS”). On January 1, 2010, DPSRS became part of the Public Employees’ 
Retirement Association of Colorado (“PERA”), and since then Mr. Justus now receives his 
pension benefits from PERA.”
215
 
Justus and a few other named plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all the people who 
were eligible to retire between March 1, 1994 and February 28, 2010 (in the case of PERA 
employees) or between 1974 and February 28, 2010 (in the case of Denver Public School 
employees), as well as their survivors.
216
 In other words, the lawsuit represents people who were 
eligible to retire during the time period after PERA and the Denver public school system adopted 
COLAs in the first instance, but before Senate Bill 10 went into effect.  
As the plaintiffs’ lawyer told the Wall Street Journal, the retirees “lived up to their end of 
the bargain, and the state is not living up to theirs.”
217
 The complaint included a chart showing 
that “hypothetical ‘average’ retiree will lose more than $165,000 in benefits over the next twenty 
years” due to a 2% COLA rather than a 3.5% COLA.
218
 
The plaintiffs primarily claimed that the pension reform bill violated the U.S. Contracts 
Clause and the parallel Colorado constitutional clause.
219
 They also alleged a violation of the 
Takings Clause, on the rationale that the plaintiffs “had a legitimate expectation that they would 
receive annual pension increases at the levels specified under the law and by the PERA and 
DPSRS plans in effect when they became eligible to retire or when they retired,” and the COLA 
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On June 29, 2011, the state judge issued an order granting summary judgment to the state 
of Colorado.
221
 The judge held that “[w]hile Plaintiffs unarguably have a contractual right to 
their PERA pension itself, they do not have a contractual right to the specific COLA formula in 
place at their respective retirement, for life without change.”
222
 The judge based this 
determination on the fact that the statutory COLAs “have never included durational language 
stating or suggesting that a particular COLA provision formula (and there have been many) was 
for life without change. For four decades the COLA formulas as applied to retirees have 
repeatedly changed and have never been frozen at the date of retirement.”
223
 The judge also was 
swayed by the fact that some retirees had barely worked towards a 3.5% COLA at all: as to one 
particular plaintiff, the judge noted that “[a]t the time she retired on August 1, 2001, the 3.5% 
compounding COLA formula to which she would claim a lifetime right had been changed so 
often that it had only been in place for a total of five months.”
224
 The plaintiffs have since 
appealed the dismissal of their claim.
225
 
Under the legal theory I have outlined, however, this Colorado ruling went too far. Some 
of the retirees could have been working under a system promising a 3.5% COLA for as long as 
nine years, between 2001 and 2010. Yet those retirees were not given a pro-rated COLA based 
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on their period of service. Instead, the COLA was reduced outright, with no allowance made for 
the period of time during which workers or retirees had been promised a higher COLA. A better 
way would be to treat such promises as contractual in nature. As noted above, the legislature 
could have said that each retiree’s COLA will be determined by prorating according to whatever 
COLA formula and/or statutory level was in place for various years of the retiree’s working life.  
B. South Dakota 
South Dakota, like Colorado, recently passed legislation that amended COLAs for its 
state pension system.
226
 First a bit of history: as of 1982, the COLA for South Dakota retirees 
was the percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI), but not exceeding 3% 
compounded annually.
227
 As of 1988, the COLA was guaranteed to be 3% compounded 
annually.
228
 As of 1993, the COLA was raised to a guaranteed 3.1%.
229
 
The new legislation went into effect on July 1, 2010, and resulted in the following 
changes to all COLAs, including for people who are already retired:  
1) COLAs are eliminated for first-year retirees;  
2) the 2010 COLA was reduced from 3.1% to 2.1%;  
3) for all future years, the COLA will be determined based on the pension system’s 
funded status and the CPI (at 100% funding, the COLA is 3.1%; at 90+% funded status, the 
COLA is linked to the CPI with a 2.1% minimum and 2.8% maximum; at 80+% funded status, 
the COLA is linked to the CPI with a 2.1% minimum and 2.4% maximum; and if the funded 
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status drops below 80%, the COLA is 2.1%).
230
 
The lawsuit Tice v. South Dakota
231
 was filed in Hughes County, South Dakota, and 
purported to represent all of the people who retired between July 1, 1982 and June 30, 2010, and 
their survivors.
232
 The complaint contended that due to the COLA adjustment, a typical retiree 
would “lose between $40,264.62 and $77,414.68 in pension benefits over the next 20 years.”
233
 
The first count alleged that the COLA adjustment violated South Dakota’s Contracts 
Clause, which states, “No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts or 
making any irrevocable grant of privilege, franchise or immunity, shall be passed.”
234
 The 
complaint likewise alleged a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Contracts Clause.
235
 Count III 
alleged a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Takings Clause,
236
 while Count IV alleged a 
violation of substantive due process.
237
 
The South Dakota courts have barely ever considered the issue of contractual protection 
for public pension rights. The most recent case I could find came from 1953, and the South 
Dakota Supreme Court there held that a public worker was not vested in a pension until the 
actual retirement date.
238
 Specifically, the court said, “There is nothing in the Act which supports 
plaintiffs’ contention that 30 years of service creates a vested right. It is retirement that brings 
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into existence the fund upon which the pensioner has the right to depend.”
239
 
Thus, unsurprisingly, the trial court’s April 11, 2012 decision upheld the state’s pension 
reform. In that decision, the court relied heavily on legal precedent noting that statutes should be 
construed as within the discretion of the legislature to change going forward, absent some clear 
indication that an unbreakable contract was established.
240
  Because the South Dakota statute did 
not contain any clear indication that would create a “forever 3.1% COLA,” plaintiffs did not 
have such a contractual right.
241
 Indeed, the court suggested that it would be “hesitant” ever to 
find such a right, because a legislature in one year should not be able to “limit the powers and 
duties of future legislatures to provide sound governance of a fund so critical to so many present 
and future retirees, not to mention to taxpayers.”
242
 The court further observed that under the 
plaintiffs’ preferred approach, “future legislatures would, no doubt, dramatically scale back 
future COLAs for all participants in all market conditions, in the knowledge that any COLA is 
forever.”
243
 The court thus acknowledged the perhaps counterintuitive fact that to hold in favor 
of one set of workers might be to disadvantage many other workers.    
Again, though, by my reasoning, this court went too far. Under the pro rata approach, a 
worker who retired in 2012 after having started work in 1982 would receive COLAs calculated 
as follows: For approximately one-fifth of the COLA (accounting for the 1982-88 time period), 
the plan would look at the current CPI but with a 3% cap; for approximately one-sixth of the 
COLA, the plan would apply the 3% compounded figure in place from 1988-93; for the 1993-
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2010 period, the plan would apply 3.1%; for 2010 itself, the plan would apply the 2.1% rate; and 
for 2011-12, the plan would apply the formula that is now in place. Having averaged all of that 
together on a weighted basis, the plan would then come up with the actual COLA given to this 
particular retiree. This calculation may seem complicated, but it would be quite simple to set up 
with any computer spreadsheet.    
C. Minnesota 
From 1981 to 1992, the Minnesota State Retirement System applied COLAs on an ad hoc 
basis determined by investment earnings.
244
 In 1992, the Minnesota Legislature changed to a 
complicated formula that included a component for inflation (up to a maximum of 2.5%) and a 
component for investment returns if investments earned more than the actuarial assumption of 
8.5%; no investment component was paid between 2003 and 2009, and the COLA during that 
period averaged 2.1% per year.
245




Minnesota passed an Omnibus Pension Bill
247
 on May 15, 2010. The bill made a wide 
number of modifications to several different plans, most significantly including adjusting all of 
the COLAs downwards to somewhere between zero and 2% until the plan(s) are fully funded.
248
 
“The state passed legislation based on the severe drop in the market,” Minnesota State 
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Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on behalf of the class of all people who retired between July 1, 
1992 and May 15, 2010. The lawsuit claimed that the 2010 bill “violates the vested right of all 
Class Members to receive annual postretirement adjustments to their pension benefits according 
to the formula in effect when they began receiving a pension.”
250
 According to the complaint, the 
average pension recipient would lose “just over $28,000 in benefits over the next ten years due to 
the elimination of the guaranteed 2.5% annual increase and if the Public Employee Retirement 
Fund does not reach a 90% funding level.”
251
 
The lawsuit included counts alleging a violation of Minnesota’s Contracts Clause (which 
provides, “No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts 
shall be passed . . . .”
252
), Minnesota’s Takings Clause (which provides, “Private property shall 
not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor, first paid 
or secured”
253
), and the U.S. Constitution’s Contracts and Takings Clauses.
254
 
On June 29, 2011, the state court judge issued an order granting summary judgment to 
the state.
255
 The court noted that “statutes are not contracts absent plain and unambiguous terms 
that show an intent to contract,” and that to conclude otherwise would intrude on the 
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 In response to the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
legislature had not expressly reserved the right to change the COLA calculations, the court held 
that this was placing the burden on the wrong side: it was the plaintiffs who must show via 
“compelling language” that the statute was meant to create unamendable rights, while the 
“Legislature need not reserve the right to exercise its inherent authority” to amend statutes.
257
 
Moreover, even if the statute provided contractual protections, the amendments were “a 
minimal alteration in the calculation of future adjustments to retirees’ annuities and a reasonable 
response to a fiscal threat that jeopardized the long-term interests of Plan members, the State, 
and the State’s taxpayers.”
258
 The court added that “legislative flexibility to respond to 
unintended operational consequences of plan terms, or funding deficiencies stemming from 
economic and marketplace forces beyond the control of the Legislature and the Plans, is critical 
to fulfilling the broader public interest in providing a benefit adequate for all members.”
259
 
By the theory I have outlined, this judge erred in the same way as did the Colorado judge. 
For example, workers who retired with a full career’s worth of service in 2010 should 
presumptively be entitled to a pro-rated COLA based on the following weighted average: one 
year of employment with a guaranteed 2.5%, 17 years of employment with the formula in place 
between 1992 and 2009, and another 12 years of employment with the ad hoc investment-based 
calculation in place before 1992. The average COLA for each employee might be different, but 
would be based on that employee’s actual service and the terms in place at that time. Moreover, 
although these calculations seem complex, all that would be required is setting up a fairly simple 
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spreadsheet in which each employee’s years or months of service can be entered under the 
appropriate factor.  
D.  New Hampshire 
There have been numerous recent pension reform bills and lawsuits in New Hampshire.  
1.  The AFT case 
HB 653 (2007)
260
 restricted funding to the “special account” for COLAs to years in 
which the overall funding ratio was at least 85%, and then only to the extent that the remaining 
assets of the retirement system earned in excess of 10.5%.
261
 Then, HB 1945 (2008)
262
 redefined 
“earnable compensation”— on which pensions are based – to exclude most forms of 
compensation other than wages,
263
 transferred $250 million out of the “special account” that 
funded COLAs,
264
 and limited COLAs to 1.5% of the first $30,000 (instead of the former limit of 
5%), and then only in the fiscal year 2008-09.
265
 After that year, no more COLAs would be paid.  
The first New Hampshire lawsuit, American Federation of Teachers et al. v. State of New 
Hampshire, was filed by a coalition of nine state employees’ unions, along with several 
individually named plaintiffs.
266
 The lawsuit purported to represent all NH pension members as 
of August 29, 2008, who might receive benefits in the future, as well as retirees receiving 
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COLAs as of July 1, 2007 or July 1, 2008.
267
 The complaint challenged pension reform on the 
grounds that 1) prior to August 29, 2008, “earnable compensation” included not just wages, but 
“other compensation paid to the member by the employer,”
268
 but now the law excludes all 
“other compensation”
269
; 2) from 1993 to 2007, COLAs had ranged from 1% to a maximum of 
5%, subject to available funding from a “special account” established for the precise purpose of 
funding COLAs, but HB 653 and HB 1745 prevented the special account from being funded to 
nearly the extent that it once was
270




The complaint alleged violations of the contracts clauses of the New Hampshire 
Constitution
272
 and the U.S. Constitution,
273
 the U.S. Constitution’s Takings Clause,
274
 and the 
U.S. Constitution’s protection of substantive due process.
275
 In addition, the complaint alleged 
that HB 1645’s section transferring $250 million out of the “special account” for COLAs 
violated a provision of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights stating that “all of the assets and 
proceeds, and income there from, of the New Hampshire retirement system . . . and all 
contributions and payments made to any such system to provide for retirement and related 
benefits shall be held, invested or disbursed as in trust for the exclusive purpose of providing for 
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such benefits and shall not be encumbered for, or diverted to, any other purposes.”
276
 The most 
recent event in this case is an order on class certification, but the court has not yet addressed the 
merits at all. 
As outlined above, the best way to resolve this case would be for a court to hold that: 1) 
pre-2008 service should be eligible for extra compensation to be counted towards final average 
salary on a prorated basis; and 2) 1993-2007 service should be eligible for prorated COLAs by 
applying whatever formula was then in effect.  
2. The Judges case 
In another 2010 case, a New Hampshire court struck down pension reform on the 
grounds that public employees have a right to the same terms as when they began employment. 
The case of Cloutier v. State of New Hampshire
277
 involved a 2003 statutory change to the 
judicial retirement system. Prior to 2003, the judicial retirement system was governed by a 
provision granting retired judges 75% of the “currently effective annual salary of the office from 
which the [judge] retired.”
278
 In 2003, the legislature decided that retired judges would receive 
no more than 75% of their own final year’s salary.
279
 In effect, this meant that retired judges 
would no longer receive “the advantages of any raises or COLAs instituted for the benefit of the 
judges presently sitting after their retirement.”
280
 
Retired judges sued, claiming that the modification violated contractual protections in the 
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state and federal constitutions. (New Hampshire’s Constitution does not contain an actual 
Contracts Clause, but does have a bar on “ex post facto” laws that the state supreme court has 
held to provide an equivalent protection,
281
 which is not that surprising given that other states 
and the federal Constitution all treat the impairment of contracts as something parallel to an ex 
post facto law.) 
On September 21, 2010, a state judge issued an order granting summary judgment to the 
retired judges. The judge found first that the “plaintiffs’ retirement benefits vested when they 
became permanent employees.”
282
 These benefits included the previous statutory right to receive 
a higher pension due to future raises and COLAs.  
The judge next found that the 2003 statute was a “substantial” impairment of this 
contractual benefit, because “retirement benefits are precisely the kind intended to promote an 
employee’s reliance” – that is, “judges are entitled to plan their retirement knowing that the 
legislature will not significantly alter earned benefits after the completion of his or her tenure.”
283
 
The judge found that the state’s desire to avoid unfunded liabilities was “not sufficient to 
establish that the statute is reasonable and necessary.”
284
 The judge cited a United States 
Supreme Court holding to the effect that if a “State could reduce its financial obligations 
whenever it wanted to spend the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the 
Contract Clause would provide no protection at all.”
285
 Thus, the 2003 statutory change was 
“unconstitutional as applied to the judges who accepted their positions before the statutory 
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On March 30, 2012, the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued a decision in this case.
287
 
The court said that “whether a public retirement plan creates a contract between a public 
employee and the State is a question of first impression in New Hampshire.”
288
 Nonetheless, the 
court cited a number of previous New Hampshire cases noting that pensions are a means of 
attracting employees, that they are a substantial part of compensation, and that they would be of 
little use if they could be “whisked away at the whim” of the employer.
289
 Based on these 
holdings, along with cases from California and elsewhere, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
concluded that the N.H. pension statues “created an implied-in-fact contract between the State 
and the judges who entered into employment when the statutes were in effect, which vested 
when they were appointed to be judges subject to attaining the age and service requirements.”
290
 
The N.H. Supreme Court rejected, however, the trial court’s conclusion that any 
abridgment of a right that “induced the parties to contract in the first place” was inherently 
substantial.
291
 Instead, just as in other states, a reduction could be balanced by a countervailing 
benefit. Hence, the N.H. Supreme Court reversed and remanded “for the court to determine in 
the first instance whether the contractual impairment is offset by any compensating benefits.”
292
 
The New Hampshire courts’ belief that employees are entitled to keep in place a system 
of pension accruals merely because it existed on their first day of employment finds no basis in 
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actual contract law or other employment contracts. To be sure, the legislature should not be 
allowed free rein to alter the pension system to the extent that it takes away accrued benefits for 
previous years of employment. Thus in that sense, an employee ought to have a measure of 
contractual protection from the first day of employment (as the days go on, an employee’s 
entitlement to a pension ought to parallel the number of days he or she has been employed under 
that system). But it goes to the opposite extreme to say that pension systems cannot be changed 
even on a going-forward basis for current employees; such a holding would be akin to locking 
the current level of salaries in place forever, even for future years in which the employees have 
not yet performed any labor or even been guaranteed a job at all.  
The best way to resolve this case is therefore for a court to hold that 1) retired judges are 
presumptively entitled to the salary calculation as in place during their years of service (if tying 
their pensions to the current judicial salary is too onerous, this would merely encourage the state 
not to raise current judicial salaries too high); 2) current judges are entitled only to a prorate 
version of the final salary average calculation, as described above.  
3. The House Bill 2 cases 
Finally, a further New Hampshire bill in 2011 (House Bill 2) increased member 
contribution rates by two percentage points, among many other things.
293
  It was immediately 
followed by a union lawsuit filed in June of that year, challenging the increased contribution 
rates, and a second lawsuit filed on February 29, 2012 (this will be further discussed below). As 
to the first lawsuit, the unions’ lawyer told a local newspaper that the bill was “a 2 percent tax on 
50,000 public employees” “without a commensurate benefit.”
294
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The claims in the lawsuit were numerous. As usual, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
contribution rate increase violated the U.S. and New Hampshire contracts and takings clauses. 
The plaintiffs also alleged that the rate increase was an unreasonable tax, in violation of a New 
Hampshire constitutional provision authorizing the government to levy only “proportional and 
reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes.”
295
 Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the rate increase 
violated the New Hampshire constitutional provision stating, “The employer contributions 
certified as payable to the New Hampshire retirement system or any successor system to fund the 
system’s liabilities, as shall be determined by sound actuarial valuation and practice, independent 




A New Hampshire Superior Court issued an order on January 6, 2012.
297
 The court 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim arising under the N.H. constitutional provision requiring “sound 
actuarial practice,” on the theory that the plaintiffs had no economic stake in actuarial practice as 
their benefits would be guaranteed by the state “regardless [of] the level of funding in the 
system.”
298
 The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ claim regarding disproportionate taxation, 
because paying into a pension trust fund is merely a fee for services, rather than a tax laid upon 
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the population to support general revenue.
299
 As to the Contracts Clause arguments, the court 
was not persuaded by either side’s arguments – the state had argued that benefits could be 
“legislatively abolished up until the very day” of retirement, while plaintiffs had argued that 
“benefits vest as soon as an employee begins full time permanent employment.”
300
 Under the 
relevant N.H. statute, however, benefits were deemed “vested” after 10 years of service,
301
 and 
there is no reason to think that such vested benefits could be stripped away at any time before 
actual retirement.
302
 Without discussing how an increased contribution rate (which necessarily 
applies only to future accruals) would affect the previously vested benefits, the court then held 
that the impairment of an increased contribution rate was substantial because “it requires 
employees, who have already met the requisite service and age requirements, to pay additional 
amounts – which may be an amount reserved for other expenses, like mortgages, housing, and 
food – without receiving additional benefit.”
303
 All of that said, the court held that because the 
plaintiffs had not specifically alleged that they satisfied the 10-year-vesting requirement, they 
had failed to allege an element of their case, and their complaint would therefore be dismissed 
with leave to amend.
304
 The plaintiffs did amend their complaint, and a trial is scheduled for 
October 2012. As noted above, however, increasing contribution rates on a going-forward basis 
should be presumptively constitutional in all cases.  
The same law firm (Molan Milner) then filed a separate lawsuit on Feb. 29, 2012, in a 
different New Hampshire court, challenging several aspects of House Bill 2 other than the 
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contribution rate increase. Specifically, the complaint alleges that House Bill 2 violates the U.S. 
and N.H. Contracts and Takings Clauses by limiting earnable compensation by excluding 
vacation and sick pay, increasing final average salary calculation period to 5 years, lowering the 
maximum benefit, increasing a minimum age requirement, reducing the multiplier from 2.5% to 
2.1%, and repealing an accidental disability exception.
305
 In this case, all of the revisions can be 
calculated on a prorated basis as described in greater detail above.  
E. New Mexico 
The pension struggle in New Mexico is somewhat different from the other states 
considered here. In 2009, the New Mexico legislature passed H.B. 854, “An Act Relating to the 
Retirement of Public Employees; Providing a Temporary Increase in Certain Employee 
Contribution Rates and a Corresponding Temporary Decrease in the Employer Contribution 
Rates.”
306
 The bill was effective as of July 1, 2009.  
What the Act did was this: For employees making over $20,000 in all the various New 
Mexico pension plans (e.g., general employees, police, etc.), the employee contribution was 
increased by 1.5 percentage points for a 2-year period, while the employer contribution was 
decreased by the same 1.5 percentage points for that same period.
307
 
A lawsuit was filed on June 15, 2009, in the case of AFSCME v. State of New Mexico.
308
 
The lawsuit alleged that the real purpose of the contribution swap here was to increase state 
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revenue, and that public employees were effectively going to “contribute to the State 
approximately $80 million for general revenues purposes.”
309
 The lawsuit brought counts based 
on various New Mexico constitutional provisions regarding taxation and finances, as well as the 
federal and state contracts and takings clauses.
310
 
The legal background in New Mexico is also different from that in other states. A 1996 
New Mexico Supreme Court case actually rejected contractual protection: in Pierce v. New 
Mexico,
311
 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that “[o]ur four retirement plans do not clearly 
and unambiguously create private contractual rights. We decline to join those states that find a 
contractual relationship where one does not clearly and unambiguously exist and that proceed to 




That said, a 1998 addition to the New Mexico Constitution created property rights – not 
contract rights – in state pension payments. That addition states, “Upon meeting the minimum 
service requirements of an applicable retirement plan created by law for employees of the state 
or any of its political subdivisions or institutions, a member of a plan shall acquire a vested 
property right with due process protections under the applicable provisions of the New Mexico 
and United States constitutions.”
313
 The provision goes on to state, however, that “[n]othing in 
this section shall be construed to prohibit modifications to retirement plans that enhance or 
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preserve the actuarial soundness of an affected trust fund or individual retirement plan.”
314
  
Thus, whatever this “vested property right with due process protections” might mean, 
New Mexico legislators appear to retain the authority to modify pension benefits so as to aid the 
actuarial soundness of the plan. As argued extensively above, courts should preserve the ability 
of a state legislature to adjust contribution levels on a going-forward basis.  
F. Massachusetts 
In 2009, Massachusetts passed a pension reform bill that modified how state pensions are 
calculated. The state had been roiled by a newspaper report finding that “over the prior six years, 
102 Boston firefighters had substantially enhanced their tax-free disability pensions by claiming 
career-ending injuries while they were filling in for superiors at higher pay grades. Some 
firefighters have sought the enhanced benefit after filling in for a superior for just one day, 
leading critics to call it the ‘king-for-a-day’ provision.”
315
 In addition, the law at the time based 
pensions on the worker’s “salary, wages or other compensation in whatever form.”
316
 
The pension reform legislation did two significant things. First, it redefined “regular 
compensation” and “wages” in Section 1 of Chapter 32 of the Massachusetts General Laws so 
that pensions would now be calculated solely based on the worker’s actual “wages.”
317
 Second, 
the legislation expressly addressed the firefighter issue by providing that “if an individual was in 
a temporary or acting position on the date such injury was sustained or 
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hazard undergone[,] the amount to be provided under this subdivision shall be based on 
the average annual rate of the individual’s regular compensation during the previous 12-month 
period for which he last received regular compensation immediately preceding the date 
such injury was sustained or such hazard was undergone.”
318
 
Oddly enough, there was a huge and suspicious spike in disability retirements just prior 
to the legislation’s effective date. As the Globe reported on June 30, 2009, 29 Boston area 
firefighters had filed for disability retirement on the preceding day, “just two days before a new 
state law ends a controversial benefit that allows them to significantly enhance their pensions if 
they claim career-ending injuries occurred while filling in for a superior at a higher pay 
grade.”
319
 The Globe further noted that “of the 29 who filed yesterday, 25 said they were filling 
in for a superior at the time of their injuries, according to city officials, which makes them 
eligible for a pension benefit at the higher salary scale. That perk, which can add hundreds of 
thousands of dollars over a retiree’s lifetime and cost taxpayers millions, will not be available to 
anyone filing after today.”
320
 
In any event, firefighters were not happy with the elimination of this loophole. A class of 
firefighters and police officers filed a lawsuit in United States District Court in Boston in mid-
2009.
321
 The complaint stated that the plaintiffs had worked “under a law which expressly 
promised that the definition of ‘regular compensation’ and the specified method of calculating 
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their pensions would not be changed. Now, when they retire, they face reduction of their pension 
benefits under the new legislative regime.”
322
 That is, they had assumed that their pensions 
would be based on “longevity pay, hazardous duty pay, clothing allowances and payments for 
unused vacation,” but now their pensions would be based only on “wages.”
323
  
The lawsuit claimed that in redefining “wages” for all “Massachusetts public pension 
members . . . who have not yet retired,”
324
 the legislation had breached the U.S. Constitution’s 
Contracts Clause, as well as Articles 1, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution.
325
 In 
addition, the complaint pointed out that Massachusetts law expressly stated that most provisions 
of the pension statute (including the definition of “wages”) “shall be deemed to establish . . . a 
contractual relationship under which members who are or may be retired . . . are entitled to 
contractual rights and benefits, and no amendments or alterations shall be made that will be 




 In any event, this lawsuit fizzled out eventually. In 2010, a Massachusetts state appeals 
court issued a ruling holding that under state statute, certain extra allowances were not part of 
base compensation in the first place.
327
 The parties ultimately agreed to dismiss the lawsuit on 
May 26, 2011. 
Under the contractual theory presented in this dissertation, a legislature can refine wages 
on a going-forward basis, but the presumption (absent a showing of an actual fiscal emergency) 
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should be that retiring public employees would get a pension calculated by prorating the 
compensation based on years worked. For example, if an employee had worked for 20 years with 
the expectation of retiring with overtime being counted towards final compensation, and then 10 
years with overtime having been eliminated in that calculation, then the ultimate pension 
awarded should include 2/3 of any overtime in the final compensation on which the pension is 
based.  
As for the “king for a day” provision, this seems like nothing more an egregious loophole 
that encourages either fraudulent claims of disability or fraudulent claims to have been filling in 
for a superior. In such a case, courts should not credit legislatures with having intended to create 
a contractual right that would never be tolerated under the light of public scrutiny.   
G. Rhode Island 
In 2009, Rhode Island passed pension reform legislation
328
 amending Chapter 36 of the 
Rhode Island Laws. Among other things, the bill required pensions to be based on the average of 
the highest five (rather than three) years of consecutive compensation for anyone retiring on or 
after October 1, 2009
329
; required members to contribute the “full actuarial cost” of various 
service credits purchased
330
; raised the standard retirement age from 60 to 62 for people retiring 
on or after October 1, 2009
331
; and, for employees not eligible to retire as of Sept. 30, 2009, 
lowered the COLA from a guaranteed 3% per year to the lower of 3% or the percentage increase 
in the Consumer Price Index.
332
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On May 12, 2010, unions in Rhode Island filed a lawsuit against the state pensions and 
various state officials.
333
 The complaint raised only two counts, under the Contracts and Takings 
Clauses of the Rhode Island Constitution. On September 16, 2011, the court issued an initial 
decision just on the issue of whether the Rhode Island pension system was subject to contractual 
protections or whether the state could change the entire pension system at will.
334
 At the outset, 
the court said, “It is important to emphasize that this Court is asked to limit its decision to the 
stipulated issue: whether a contract exists between Plaintiffs and the State.  Accordingly, the 
Court’s inquiry addresses only one element in contract clause analysis.”
335
 That is, the court did 
not consider whether the contract was breached, whether the breach was substantial, or whether 
the breach was justified by a legitimate public purpose. 
The court then noted that “[u]nlike a number of other states, Rhode Island has not 
expressly stated in its constitution or the ERSRI that pension benefits are contractual in 
nature.”
336
 Nonetheless, even without statutory language on point, the fact remains that 
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“provisions at issue constituted offers intended to “induce people to enter public employment” 
and to continue in that employment over a substantial period of time.”
337
 And that, in the court’s 
view, is the essence of a contractual offer or a “bargained-for exchange.”
338
 
In the court’s view, the Rhode Island defendants were making the argument that “the 
State may, with or without justification, significantly alter or completely terminate a public 
employee’s pension benefits at any time—even just one day—before retirement.”
339
 Simply 
because the court rejected that view does not imply that any of the actual reforms in Rhode 
Island were a substantial breach or were unjustified by a legitimate public purpose. It remains to 
be seen what the Rhode Island court will do with those questions 
Then, in late 2011, Rhode Island enacted major pension reform, thanks to the efforts of 
state treasurer Gina Raimondo, who ran for office solely on the pension issue, and who spent all 
of 2011 warning that the looming $9 billion deficit in the Rhode Island pension systems would 
prevent the state from paying for schools, roads, libraries, and more.
340
 Raimondo noted that 
Rhode Island taxpayers are paying 225% more for pension contributions than they were in 1998, 
and that the number is “projected to more than double during the next five years.”
341
 These new 
costs will burden already-endangered state spending items: “In recent years, state aid to cities 
and towns, which is used mostly for K-12 education, has decreased annually by eight percent,” 
while “Rhode Island has recently been ranked as having the worst maintained bridges and roads 
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of any state in the country.”
342
 
Why was Rhode Island in this situation? For a number of reasons, including too-
optimistic investment assumptions and longer lifespans.
343
 But a main driver of the pension costs 
in Rhode Island was that from the 1960s to 1980s, “pension benefits were substantially increased 
for state employees and teachers without corresponding contributions being made.”
344
 
Exacerbating the problem, “[a]ll of these benefit increases were applied retroactively to current 
employees,” meaning that someone who was one day away from retirement could retire with a 
higher pension than had ever been contemplated in his or her career.
345
 Indeed, Raimondo noted 
that “retired public employees can routinely earn retirement benefits that exceed 100 percent of 
their final average earnings by the time they are several years into their retirement,” while 




These problems could not be addressed simply by making going-forward reforms as to 
current workers, who were already “contributing a significant amount of their salary to the 
pension system, the majority of which goes to pay for past service, not for their own future 
retirement.”
347
 Some reductions had to apply to current workers and retirees.  
That is exactly what Rhode Island ultimately did in a bill passed on November 17, 2011. 
As described in greater detail above, the bill moved current workers to a new hybrid system, 
lowered the multiplier, increased the retirement age, and reduced or eliminated COLAs, among 
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Chapter 2 of this dissertation explained in more detail why the Rhode Island legislation is 
a model for implementing the principle of protecting past accruals even while making radical 
changes going forward. But what will happen given Rhode Island jurisprudence is debatable. 
Some cases suggest that at least retirees have a contractual right under Rhode Island law not to 
have their cost-of-living benefits decreased. In the 2007 case of Arena v. City of Providence,
348
 a 
state statute was in effect approving a city collective bargaining agreement that had granted a 5% 
compounded COLA.
349
 After the plaintiffs (city firefighters) had retired, the city passed new 
ordinances that reduced the COLA to a non-compounded three percent.
350
 On a contracts 
analysis, the court “agree[d] with plaintiffs and hold that they have a vested interest in the COLA 
provided in Ordinance 1991-5,” that is, the ordinance with the 5% COLA.
351
 This is because “in 
Rhode Island, pension benefits vest once an employee honorably and faithfully meets the 
applicable pension statute’s requirements,”
352
 whereas the statute in effect at that time expressly 
provided that “eligibility for a retirement allowance and the amount of such allowance shall be 
determined in accordance with the provisions of the ordinance to provide for the retirement of 
employees of the City of Providence as in effect on the last day of a member’s employment.”
353
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It was important to the court that the plaintiffs had already retired: “the city has broad 
discretion to prospectively change the pension benefit plan for firefighters and police officers 
who have not yet retired by enacting a new ordinance. Nevertheless, the issue confronting us is 
whether the council has authority to retroactively redefine a pension term.”
354
 The court thus 
held that “plaintiffs’ interest in a 5 percent compounded COLA vested upon their retirement and 
cannot be altered by future ordinances.”
355
 
Based on this case, Rhode Island courts may view the legislature as having the authority 
to alter prospective accruals for existing workers, but not the terms applicable to people who 
have already retired.  
H. New Jersey 
In late 2011, New Jersey passed legislation increasing employee contribution rates by one 
to three percentage points.
356
 For general public employees and teachers, the rate increased from 
5.5% to 6.5% immediately, with a phased-in increase to 7.5% over the next seven years.
357
 
Unions responded by filing a federal lawsuit alleging violations of the federal and state 
contracts clauses.
358
 On March 5, 2012, the federal district court judge issued an order dismissing 
the lawsuit, albeit not on the merits.
359
 Instead, the court held that because the plaintiffs were 
asking for a return of contributions, their complaint violated the U.S. Constitution’s 11
th
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Amendment, which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to disallow most lawsuits against 
state governments for retrospective money damages.
360
 Further, to the extent that the plaintiffs 





Immediately upon dismissal, the plaintiffs filed a duplicate lawsuit in New Jersey state court, 
where nothing has happened as yet.
362
 As noted above, though, the courts should allow any 
contribution rate to go forward.  
At the same time, a different set of retiree plaintiffs challenged the COLA reduction in 
the same New Jersey law.
363
 According to news reports, the state judge issued an oral ruling 
(with no written decision) that the retired plaintiffs are not contractually entitled to COLAs on 
retirement.
364
 Assuming that this ruling was accurately described, the judge may have gone too 
far in holding that even retired plaintiffs are not presumptively entitled to a prorated version of 
whatever COLA was promised to them during actual years of employment.  
I. Washington 
In October 2011, the state of Washington enacted House Bill 2021 eliminating future 
COLAs for retirees in two state pension plans.
365
 While a previous 1995 law had provided an 
automatic COLA, the new legislation essentially froze pension payments as of the bill’s effective 
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date, including for existing retirees. Defenders of the legislation contended that the 1995 law 
establishing the COLA gave the state legislature the prerogative to make changes.  
State employee unions filed multiple lawsuits alleging violations of the state and federal 
contracts clauses.
366
 Those lawsuits were consolidated on January 17, 2012, and class 
certification was granted on May 21, 2012.
367
 No further developments have taken place on the 
substantive issues.  
What might happen in this case? Previous state court rulings suggest that Washington 
pension benefits receive contractual protection after vesting, and can be amended only to protect 
the financial stability of the system. In Bakenhus v. Seattle,
368
 the Washington Supreme Court 
held that an “employee who accepts a job to which a pension plan is applicable . . . is entitled to 
receive the same when he has fulfilled the prescribed conditions. His pension rights may be 
modified prior to retirement, but only for the purpose of keeping the pension system flexible and 
maintaining its integrity.”
369
 Then a 1993 Washington Supreme Court seemed to adopt the 
“contract at time of employment” theory, holding that a public worker’s right to a pension is a 
“vested, contractual right based on a promised made by the State at the time an employee 
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A 2010 lower court case from Washington may suggest the outer limits of pension 
protection in that state. In 1998 and 2000, the legislature had enacted a “gain sharing” provision 
that would essentially return to members at least part of any investment gains that exceeded 10% 
for a 4-year period. Then the gain-sharing law was repealed in 2007. A lawsuit ensued, and a 
state trial judge struck down the repeal.
371
 Notably, the gain-sharing legislation had included a 
prominent disclaimer: “The legislature reserves the right to amend or repeal this [law] in the 
future and no member or beneficiary has a contractual right to receive this post retirement 
adjustment not granted prior to that amendment or repeal.”
372
 The court struck down the repeal in 
somewhat ambiguous terms. That is, it is not clear whether the court was merely striking down 
an attempt to eliminate gain-sharing awards that had already been made, or whether it was 
further striking down any attempt to restrict gain-sharing awards that might take place in the 
future (for employees who were already in place before 2007, of course).  
In any event, the court cited a Washington Supreme Court case holding that under basic 
contractual analysis, “even though the employer has reserved the right to amend or terminate the 
plan, once an employee, who has accepted employment under such plan, has complied with all 
the conditions entitling him to participate in such plan, his rights become vested and the 
employer cannot divest the employee of his rights thereunder.”
373
 (Again, though, this reasoning 
was not entirely clear on whether the court intended merely to protect past gain-sharing awards 
made prior to 2007, or whether it intended to guarantee all pre-2007 employees a right to get 
future gain-sharing awards for the rest of their lives.)  Because the removal of gain-sharing had 
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In 2011, Arizona passed a law akin to the New Mexico law; whereas employers and 
employees had formerly split contributions 50/50, the new law changed the employer/employee 
ratio to 47/53, thereby requiring employees to pay “more” towards their pensions.
375
 Said a local 
news story, “Just because there was a 50-50 split when these workers were hired does not entitle 
them to the same treatment as long as they are employed, argued Assistant Attorney General 
Charles Grube in court papers filed Aug. 11.”
376
 In addition, the average amount contributed by 
an employee earning $50,000 a year would rise by merely $12.41 per paycheck, whereas the 
cumulative savings for the state would be considerable.
377
 The state contended that the law 
merely “provides for a change to the terms of future employment,” akin to the “power of the 
state to change salaries.”
378
 
An Arizona state court issued a ruling on February 1, 2012 (made final on April 12) 
holding in favor of the plaintiffs.
379
As is the case in other states, Arizona’s constitution provides 
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 Barnes v. Arizona State Retirement System, No.CV 2011-011638 (Superior Court of 







that “public retirement system benefits shall not be diminished or impaired.”
380
 The court said 
that the plaintiffs had received retirement benefits (actually, the promise thereof) for which they 
had agreed to pay 50% of the cost, but an increase in that contribution rate “retroactively and 
unilaterally seeks to substantially change terms of a contract previously agreed to by the 
parties.”
381
 Without further elaboration, the court added that the impairment was substantial and 
lacked any public purpose.
382
 The court tied the contractual protection to the first date of 
employment: “by paying a higher proportionate share for their pension benefits than they had 
been required to pay when hired, Plaintiffs are forced to pay additional consideration for a 
benefit which has remained the same.”
383
 In a further wrinkle, as of May 7, 2012, state 
lawmakers in Arizona enacted a bill (House Bill 2264) to reverse the contribution rate change 
complete with a refund of the excess contributions. 
In 2011, Arizona also passed Senate Bill 1609, which limited future COLAs given to 
retired elected officials, who promptly sued. In a May 29, 2012 ruling, a state trial court issued a 
ruling striking down the law. The court relied on the Arizona constitutional provision quoted 
above, as well as an Arizona law providing that each retiree “is entitled to receive a permanent 
increase in the base benefit equal to the amount determined pursuant to this section.”
384
Because 
all of the plaintiffs had already retired, there was nothing further they had to do to be guaranteed 
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the promised level of benefit increases.
385
 
The court did note that it was not deciding the issue whether benefits had vested at any 
point prior to retirement, which is obviously a key question that would strongly affect the 
viability of any future pension reform efforts in Arizona.
386
 That said, Arizona has seemingly 
given the strongest protection to pension benefits. In the landmark case of Yeazell v. Copins,
387
 
the plaintiff had worked from 1942 to 1962, was already retired, and wished to have the benefit 
of the pension benefit originally promised as of 1942 (with final average salary calculated over a 
one year period) rather than as of a 1952 amendment to the plan (final average salary equal to the 
average over five years). The Arizona Supreme Court held that “the right to a pension becomes 
vested upon acceptance of employment,” noting that pension benefits “are not dependent upon 
the benevolence of the employing agency but are prescribed by the legislature and the conditions 
of the employment” as a “valuable part of the consideration for the entrance into and 
continuation in public employment.”
388
 Thus, in the words of the court:  
It is evidence from what we have said that appellant had the right to rely on the terms 
of the legislative enactment of the Police Pension Act of 1937 as it existed at the 
time he entered the service of the City of Tucson and that the subsequent legislation 
may not be arbitrarily applied retroactively to impair the contract. Appellant’s right 
to be retired under the Police Pension Act of 1937 existed until he evidenced an 
intention to be bound by or assented to the modifications provided in the amendment 
of 1952. The presumption would, of course, be that until appellant exercised his right 
of election the 1952 amendment was acceptable to him, but once having made an 
election both he and his widow are forever bound thereby. We do not consider that 
appellant can be compelled to a choice between the 1937 act or the 1952 amendment 
by legislative coercion. His acquiescence in the application of the 1952 amendment 
during his employment is not alone sufficient to establish a waiver or an estoppel of 
rights under the 1937 act . . . .
389
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At the limits, this is a surprising holding. It implies that if a worker starts on Day One 
with a pension benefit promised at a particular level, and if the pension benefit is reduced on Day 
Two through the rest of his 30 years of state employment, the fact that he worked 30-year-minus-
one-day at the lower promised level of pension benefits would not count as any sort of 
acquiescence in that level of pension benefits.
390
 Instead, at retirement, he would have a legal 
right to the higher level in effect for only a single day thirty years before.   
To be sure, as discussed earlier, the Yeazell case involved a worker who had been 
employed for a full 10 years under the previous level of pension accrual, and to apply the 1952 
law would have essentially invalidated the benefit of those 10 years of employment. The 1952 
law, in other words, did not prorate the benefit calculation (as I have suggested) based on the 
number of years of service under the prior rule; instead, it purported to apply a new calculation 
wholesale to anyone who retired after 1952. In that circumstance, the court (which never 
considered the issue of proration) was inclined to protect the employee’s previous 10 years of 
accrual. 
Still, even if Yeazell can be limited in this fashion, Arizona courts would do better to 
explicitly harmonize their pension jurisprudence with the jurisprudence as to other employee 
benefits that admittedly can be changed on a forward-looking basis even if past accruals are 
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protected. For instance, in Bennett ex rel. Arizona State Personnel Commission v. Beard,
391
 a 
state architect had been hired when annual leave accrued at 18 days per year, but then the law 
was changed to reduce annual leave to 15 days per year. The architect sued, claiming that the 
rate of annual leave accrual could not be reduced. The Arizona court rejected this claim, holding 
that under Yeazell, the architect had a right to 18 days of leave for the year he had worked under 
the old system, but that the legislature had the right to alter the future terms of employment. 
Indeed, the court characterized Yeazell as having involved “the attempted retroactive change of 
previously vested contractual rights,” whereas this case involved “future benefits as yet 
unvested.”
392
 Similarly, in a 1981 case, the Arizona appeals court reiterated that in previous 
cases (including Yeazell), “the courts recognized that a vested contractual right to benefits 
existed only when an employee had already performed services and earned benefits, the payment 
of which was to be made at a future date. This same rationale does not apply where a city has 
merely adopted an ordinance which provides for the payment of certain benefits, and an 
employee has yet to perform services entitling him to the benefits.”
393
 
The same rule should apply to pensions: if a pension benefit is being retroactively altered, 
then that should be presumptively a contract violation. But if (unlike the case in Yeazell) the state 
only modifies the rate of accrual going forward, there is no reason to give employees a right to 
block such legislation any more than they can block the rate at which leave days are accrued. In 
either case, the law is leaving past accruals in place while altering the terms for future work that 
has yet to be performed.  
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In mid-2011, the Cincinnati city council made several changes to its pension plan, 
including increasing retirement age to age 60 with 30 years of service (previously, it had been 30 
years of service at any age), and reducing the COLA from a guaranteed 3% compounded rate to 
2% on the base pension. In June 2011, employees filed a state court lawsuit based on state and 
federal contracts clauses. There has been no activity in the lawsuit since July 2011, however, and 
there is no indication that a court ruling is forthcoming.
394
 
To review the Ohio jurisprudence on this question: although early Ohio cases treated 
pensions as mere gratuities,
395
 a seminal 1948 case rejected that line of reasoning and followed 
the trend in other states of holding that people who had retired with a particular level of pension 
benefits “have acquired a vested right to the pensions granted them which cannot be taken away 
or adversely affected by subsequent legislation or rule.”
396
 Unlike many states, however, Ohio 
actually has a statute providing that pension benefits are vested when actually granted by the 
pension board – that is, after retirement.
397
 Thus, in the one Ohio Supreme Court case applying a 
Contracts Clause analysis to pension benefits during the past 50 years, a public school teacher’s 
husband whose wife had died prior to retirement filed a lawsuit demanding the return not just of 
her contributions to the retirement system but the interest on those contributions as well. The 
court held that “a right does not become vested until it is granted,” and “public school teachers 
                                                 
394
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do not possess contract rights in any [pension] benefit unless and until the benefit vests.”
398
 
Because the teacher had not yet retired at the time of death, her right to receive a refund of 
interest had not yet vested, and therefore no Contracts Clause issue arose when the state refused 
to pay her widower anything above the actual contributions made.
399
 
If Ohio courts stick with this sort of holding, then there are effectively few limits on how 
the state could modify pension accruals at any time prior to retirement. Indeed, the state might be 
free to reduce past pension accruals prior to retirement, on the theory that even past accruals had 
not yet vested. As a matter of how employment benefits should be structured, this would seem 
too far in the direction of not protecting accruals. At the same time, the risk of state modification 
logically ought to take into account when state employees and employers come to terms on 
wages and benefits. If state employees are effectively accepting higher wages and/or current 
benefits in exchange for more insecurity about the level of pension benefits, then that is simply 
all part of the give-and-take of the labor market. In any event, while the Contracts Clause 
protects the actual terms of contracts that have been made, it does not require that a particular 
type of contract term be forcibly written into all contracts in the first place. 
L. Baltimore 
In Baltimore, the pension system had a so-called “variable benefit” feature enacted in 
1982.
400
 Under that variable benefit, if investment returns exceeded 7.5% in any given year, 
retirees got a boost to their monthly payment for the rest of their life. The system established two 
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funds to hold “variable benefit” assets and to buy fixed-income instruments for each retiree as 
benefits were awarded. Variable benefits were further used in compounding fashion whenever 
future variable benefits were awarded (i.e., previous variable benefits were used as part of the 
base pay for future calculations). Variable benefits were a one-way ratchet, however: retirees did 
not have their prior variable benefits lowered when investment returns faltered.  
Notably, the variable benefit statute included a provision stating that the “continuation of 
any benefit increase previously accrued . . . is specifically made contingent on the ability of the 
[funds] to provide these benefits in the future.”
401
 The statute allowed the board to reduce or 
eliminate previous variable benefits for retirees who lived longer than expected so as to cause a 
“decline in the value of the [funds].”
402
 Finally, the statute even contained a provision stating that 
“§§ 37 and 42 to the contrary notwithstanding, any benefit increase provided under this section is 
not and does not become an obligation of the City of Baltimore. In the event of any conflict 
between this section and either or both § 37 or § 42, this section prevails.”
403
 Sections 37 and 42, 
in turn, respectively provided that pensions were obligations of the City and that such benefits 
would not be diminished or impaired. Thus, the variable benefit statute went as far out of the 
way as possible to make clear that the variable benefit was not a contractual obligation regardless 
of any other statute protecting pension benefits in general.  
In 2010, the city council finally decided that the Variable Benefit feature was 
unaffordable. It enacted a new ordinance that did away with new Variable Benefit increases 
entirely, substituting a COLA of 1% for retirees between 55 and 64 and 2% for older retirees. 
The ordinance did not eliminate any previously-awarded variable benefit increases, but left them 
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in place for retirees’ lifetimes. 
Retirees still sued, alleging that they had a contractual right not just to receive past 
variable benefit awards, but to keep receiving them in the future too. A federal court issued a 
preliminary order on Sept. 6, 2011, addressing only the issue of impairment.
404
The court noted 
that “legislative action that modifies or reduces future pension benefits which have not yet vested 
does not constitute an ‘impairment,’” but that impairment “only occurs where the legislative 
action applies retroactively to vested pension benefits.”
405
 Using that framework, the court issued 
a three-part holding as to impairment, holding that people who were already retired and eligible 
for Variable Benefit increases had a “retroactive impairment”; that people who were eligible to 
retire but who were still working (and hence not yet receiving benefits) had a “retroactive 
impairment” as to any years of previous service, but not as to any future years of service; and 
that people who were not yet eligible to retire had no retroactive impairment.
406
 In the latter 
holding, the court thought that it would “unduly stretch the concept of a ‘vested’ right” to accept 
plaintiffs’ argument that “rights vest the first day of employment under the Plan.”
407
 
The court next addressed the issue of whether the impairment was retroactive. The city 
had argued that no retroactivity was possible, because all previous variable benefit awards were 
still being paid, and the only consequence of the new law was that future variable benefit awards 
would be eliminated. The court rejected this argument, noting that on such reasoning, “anything 
that affects what will take place in the future could be said to have no retroactive effect,” even, 
                                                 
404
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say, reducing a pension benefit from $500 to $400 a month.
408
 To the contrary, reducing future 
vested payments in such a way would have a retroactive impact, in that it would reduce the value 
of rights that had already accrued and vested. Similarly, the court reasoned, “While the value of 
the right to Variable Benefit increases cannot be determined with certainty, it is a certainty that a 
right to a pension benefit with a possibility of future Variable Benefit increases is more valuable 
than a right to a pension benefit with no such possibility.”
409
 
The next question was whether the impairment was substantial. The court held that it 
was, because the previous history of Variable Benefit increases had averaged 3% a year for all 
26 years, whereas the new COLAs maxed out at 2% (and then only for older retirees).
410
 
What about the statutory language reserving the right to eliminate benefits as well as that 
making the variable benefit not an “obligation” of the City? The federal court said that even 
though the city could change or eliminate benefits, this was only in certain circumstances 
involving depletion of the funds: “This provision does not provide the City with discretion to 
cancel or eliminate the annual Variable Benefit calculation. Nor can the City fail to pay past 
awarded Variable Benefit increases if there are funds available.”
411
 And the language about the 
City having no “obligation” merely meant that if the funds ran out of money, the City would 
have “no obligation to make the payments from other sources.”
412
 
On the whole, this decision – which addresses only the issue of impairment, not whether 
the impairment was justified by a public purpose – seems fairly consistent with the theory I have 
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outlined. The court found impairment only as to retirees and as to the previously accrued benefits 
of workers who were eligible to retire. But there was no impairment for any workers who had yet 
to be eligible to retire, and even workers past the retirement age were not impaired as to future 
variable benefit awards. In other words, the court drew a clear line between previous accruals 
that had vested at retirement age vs. any and all future accruals.  
M. Gadsden, Alabama 
In mid-2011, the Alabama Legislature enacted Act 2011-676; among other things, that 
act raised the contribution rate for public employees in the state retirement system from 6 percent 
to 8.25 percent as of October 1, 2011, and to 8.5 percent as of October 1, 2012. One provision of 
the bill allowed local municipalities whose firefighters participate in the state retirement system 
to opt into the same contribution increases.  In August 2011, the Gadsden, Alabama city council 
voted to opt for the contribution increases.
413
 Gadsden firefighters then filed a federal class-
action lawsuit, alleging that the change violated state and federal contracts clauses.
414
 
 On February 23, 2012, the federal district court issued an order denying the city’s motion 
to dismiss.
415
 As to the first element of a Contracts Clause claim, the city had argued that no 
contractual protection existed at all unless it had been “unmistakable.” The court held that the 
unmistakability doctrine did not apply, as there was “no clear Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit 
precedent” on the point; moreover, unmistakability was a point reached, if at all, only upon close 
examination of the actual provisions, and on a motion to dismiss, inferences should be drawn in 
                                                 
413
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favor of the plaintiff.
416
 The court similarly concluded that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged an 
impairment of the contract, and that the impairment (a “30 percent increase in their pension 
contributions” with no countervailing benefit) was substantial.
417
 
 As for the state claim, the court could not find any Alabama court opinion construing the 
state Contracts Clause other than to identify its purpose as “to preserve sacred the principle of the 
inviolability of contracts.”
418
 The court therefore construed the Alabama constitutional provision 
as mirroring that of the federal Constitution.
419
 
All that this holding meant, of course, was that the trial could go forward. The court was 
not holding that the plaintiffs would necessarily win in the end. Nonetheless, in my judgment, the 
court reached the wrong conclusion. As high as the bar might be for granting a motion to 
dismiss, raising employee contributions ought to be presumptively constitutional. After all, as 
noted above, no one has even considered raising employee contributions retroactively, such that 
employees would now owe more money just to get the same pension rights that they had already 
accrued in previous years. But raising the employee contribution rate going-forward is no 
different than freezing salary terms going forward, and absent a very specific employment 
contract guaranteeing raises regardless of circumstance, courts generally hold that legislatures 
are allowed to change salary terms going forward. As I have pointed out, there ought to be no 
inherent constitutional problem with offering new terms to employees for work that has not yet 
been performed in years yet to come.  
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As can be readily seen, courts are taking widely differing approaches. In four 
jurisdictions, courts have disallowed even forward-looking changes, such as changing employee 
contribution rates. In another four jurisdictions, courts have taken the opposite approach, 
allowing pension payments to be reduced even for retirees. In only one recent case (the 
Baltimore case before the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland) has a court made a 
more careful delineation of accrual rights that are protected (i.e., for retirees and people eligible 
to retire) vs. accrual rights that can be changed on a forward-looking basis (i.e., for workers not 
yet eligible to retire).  
V. CONCLUSION 
States that engage in pension reform will have to do so with an eye towards lawsuits that 
allege a Contracts Clause violation. Courts should beware of two alternative extremes that have 






Hampshire, and Arizona) have all recently held that state employees are essentially entitled to 
keep accruing pension wealth at the same rate in all future years of employment, with no 
increase in contribution rates and with no alteration even for employees who just started work 
yesterday. This extreme version of pension protection needlessly hamstrings the capabilities of 
state legislatures and municipal employers, given that they need to be able to adjust the entire 
package of salaries and benefits so as best to compete in the labor market. Moreover, as Amy 
Monahan has pointed out, this form of pension rights likely harms many of the workers that it is 
intended to protect, because the state’s remaining avenue for saving money would be to freeze 
salaries or lay off workers. Given that many workers may prefer to retain a job, or to have a 
difference balance of current salary vs. pension, it makes little sense to tie the legislature’s hands 
only as to one component of the employment package.  
At the other extreme, however, courts in other states (most recently Colorado, Minnesota, 
South Dakota, and New Jersey) have held that legislatures are entitled to reduce benefits even for 
people who already completed their entire career and are now retired. Such holdings typically 
glide over the fact that retirees spent at least part of their careers working with the promise of a 
particular benefit calculation when they retired, and at a minimum, a court should start the 
contractual analysis by assuming that the retirees have a right to the pro rata portion of benefits 
calculated in that manner. With that baseline protection in place, courts can of course proceed to 
determine whether the contractual alteration was justified by an important public purpose, such 
as a financial emergency.  
In any event, states should have the prerogative both to change the terms of pension 
accrual on a going-forward basis for current employees, and even to cut retiree benefits on a pro-






promised a different benefit. While cutting retiree benefits in such a way would still be painful, it 
may be the only option for states under dire financial pressure that would otherwise limit 
spending on other valuable services. 
This dissertation then explained how such pro rata reductions could be most logically 
implemented. In the case of changes to the multiplier, changes to the COLA, and changes to the 
contribution rate, it is fairly easy and intuitive to calculate a weighted average. Even for changes 
to the retirement age, Rhode Island has now showed how it is possible to raise the retirement age 
in inverse proportion to the years already served towards the current retirement age (and it would 
be further possible, as explained above, to annuitize the value of benefits as would have been 
received at the previous retirement age and then carry forward that value with interest to the new 
retirement age, thus preserving any previously accrued-value to the penny). Changes to the way 
that final average salary is calculated can also be prorated, as described above. Finally, even 
wholesale revisions to the retirement system, such as replacing a defined benefit plan with a cash 
balance plan or 401(k)-style plan, can preserve prior accruals by annuitizing the present value of 
pension wealth at the point of conversion to the new plan, and then carrying forward that value 
with interest until retirement.  
In short, while any actual pro rata calculations may seem daunting to a non-actuary, the 
underlying principles are fairly straightforward and should be reasonably understood by any state 
or federal judge who hears a pension reform lawsuit. Judges should therefore start with these 
principles as a baseline contractual protection, subject to reduction in cases of demonstrated 
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